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ABSTRACT
The debate on whether art has any cognitive value might be traced to the texts of early
philosophers and theorists who have approached the matter. In general, art has been constrained
to contemplation and aesthetic experience while its contribution to knowledge is often
disregarded. Science, on the other hand, constitutes the main system of organized knowledge
production and enunciation.
Contemporary artistic practices that address scientific knowledge tend to reformulate the
latter in order to either produce new experiences with it or expand its cognitive capabilities. The
works produced by these practices serve as artifacts that expose science’s biases, axiomatic
tenets, priorities, and limitations, as well as contest and complete the realms of experience in
which science fails to provide an account.
As discursive artifacts, these artworks may be analyzed from a rhetorical framework and
methodology in order to unveil their role in rearticulating science and producing responses to the
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specific situation in which they come into being. Through a rhetorical analysis of Eclipses for
Austin (2009) by Mexican artist Pablo Vargas Lugo, this thesis aims to identify and describe the
way contemporary artistic practices operate to expand on knowledge produced from scientific
inquiry and enunciation. The analysis, grounded in Lloyd Bitzer’s idea of the rhetorical
situation, has shown that these works address a rhetorical exigence (generated by the differences
and similarities between art and science), are limited and enabled by constraints from both
realms of experience, and produce a fitting response helps to expand the knowledge and
understanding formulated by science.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION
I remember when, at a drawing seminar, the instructor explained that the act of drawing
was, for her, rather a way of knowing, a way of approaching the object, instead of merely a
means to represent it. Those words resonated strongly in my head. Her argument was, and I am
paraphrasing, something like this: When one draws anything, let’s say a tree, we move at least an
iota toward a broader cognition of that particular tree (and, to some extent, toward treehood in
general); the object, simply, becomes more known to us. That thought reminded me of the old
debate regarding the cognitive capacities of art and, specifically, of representation. In thinking
about these possibilities, I tried neither to exalt nor condemn representation and art as ways of
knowing, but to discover if there is any possibility of expanding knowledge and understanding
through the experience of a specific work of art.
I recognized later how some artworks have taught me specific things (actual facts) that I
would not have known otherwise (or that would have required more time and effort to know by
other means). For instance, from the series of paintings of wedding dances and feasts by Peter
Bruegel the Elder (sixteenth century), I have learned that doublets (a wool or linen piece of
clothing used over the shirt by men) were extremely popular in sixteenth-century Flanders, and
that peasants used several ties to connect hosiery to these; from painter Frans Hals (active during
the seventeenth century) I learned not only what a rommelpot (small friction drum) looked like,
but also how it should be played; from the Edelheere altarpiece triptych I deducted the
importance and popularity of Van der Weyden’s famous Deposition painting during the fifteenth
century, for it is one of the earliest copies of the latter.
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It is clear that art, in this sense, can teach. In other words, it can provide us with a
perspective on some aspects of reality that we can grasp and later remember in order to, ideally,
expand our understanding or knowledge of some specific matter. This statement appears evident
when art is understood as figurative representation; however, art equaled to figuration can also
lead to a reduction of the functions of art. If we understand art only as figurative, it would be
sufficient to acknowledge that most scientific facts are conveyed through the use of illustrations,
diagrams, maps, and other visual (artistic?) forms. What would have happened to biology
without the use of drawing (and later photography) for the sake of the taxonomical enterprise of
the nineteenth century?
Evidently, a catalog of species without illustrations may have a very limited cognitive
value, for these images show the visual appearance of plants, animals, and other beings.
Nevertheless, this aspect also may be given by the inherent relationship between visuality itself
and cognition;1 in other words to see is to know. There seems to be a relationship between the
visual dimension of things (their visuality) and what we understand as knowledge: “Thus the
manner in which we have come to understand the concept of an ‘idea’ is deeply bound up with
the issues of ‘appearance,’ of picture, and of image.”2
This argument, however, seems to be more suitable to cognition over matters that display
primarily a visual feature. In this sense, it would be easy to conclude that art teaches, because it
(re)presents visuality. This ontological fixation of art with visuality makes it even more difficult
to isolate and identify cognitive value in artistic practice solely, and it constitutes a critical
mistake in any effort to discover knowledge through art. I would like to stress this distinction
1

Chris Jenks, “The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture,” in Visual Culture, ed.

2

Ibid.
2

because if we understand art as mere figuration, the possibility of knowledge through it would be
given only by the fact that art shows the visual dimension of an object or, in more complex cases,
freezes a visual stage of a processes or event. If we stand by this idea, there would be nothing to
discuss since knowledge of the object being represented and its representation would be the same
thing, i.e., its visual dimension.
What we learn from the botanical catalog from the nineteenth century is the shape, forms,
and colors of the plants and leaves being depicted, which is, in fact, the knowledge that is being
represented. This logic might lead us astray to a tautological loop and cannot solidly support the
idea that art can serve the purpose of knowledge conveyance or expansion; it simply reinforces
the idea that visuality is cognition, but demonstrates very little about how the artistic apparatus
can contribute to the pursuit, assertion, or communication of any new or previously acquired
knowledge.
On the other pole of the issue is the very idea of knowledge. I recognize that the use of
the word can be highly controversial. I can know a person who works in my office; I know who
he or she is by recognizing his or her facial features. I can know how to drive a car or ride a bike.
In either case, the knowledge manifested is different. In the situation discussed in the first
paragraph of this introduction (drawing a tree), there are different types of knowledge operating
at once: there is knowledge of the tree (and treehood by extension) that the artist who is drawing
experiences; there is also knowledge of what a particular, and, in general, a tree looks like that is
experienced by the viewer; and there is also knowledge of how to draw trees that is exercised by
the artist. The viewer can also experience a kind of knowledge if he or she has previous
knowledge about systems of representation, about the kind of depiction the artist is using based
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on a formalist analysis of the drawing, and the like. This list could be expanded as much as we
want, for the way we experience knowledge operates in many levels and forms.
For the purpose of this analysis, I will utilize a more classical approach to knowledge,
which could be better understood as episteme. In classic epistemology, there is commonly a
distinction between three types of knowledge. The first kind of knowledge occurs when
performing an action; it is practical application about how to perform, create, or transform
something.3 This is known as practical knowledge, like knowing how to drive or how to paint.
Secondly, there is the type of knowledge experienced when one knows or is familiar with
someone or something.4 I think this would be closer to the idea of cognition through visuality
since one knows a person for his/her features more or less in the same way that an object is
known to us by the way it looks in a figurative representation. Finally, the third type is the “kind
of knowledge you have when it is truly said of you that you know that some fact is true.”5 This is
also known as propositional knowledge.6 Therefore, propositional knowledge exists when a
subject is positively certain that a proposition (i.e., a statement) is true. Propositional knowledge
is often expressed with the following sentence: S knows that p, “where ‘S’ refers to the knowing
subject, and ‘p’ to the proposition that is known;”7 for example in “I know that apples are fruit.”

3

Jeremy Fantl, “Knowledge How,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter
2012, ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-how/.
4

Ibid.

5

Ibid.

6

Fantl also refers to it as “knowledge-that” as opposed to “knowledge-how,” which
would be constituted by practical knowledge. See Fantl, “Knowledge How.”
7

Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge,” The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2012, ed. Edward N. Zalta,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/knowledge-analysis/.
4

As could be deducted, the type of knowledge acquired from figurative representation is
not always of this latter type. As I stated previously, the analysis of knowledge in art understood
as representation might reduce our very idea of art to mere figuration. Far more interesting would
be, I think, to find propositional knowledge in the artistic practice.
Going back to the artworks that have taught me specific things (Bruegel, Hals, and the
Edelheere altarpiece), I realize that all of them operate at different levels of knowledge. If the
Bruegel paintings taught me about sixteenth-century fashion, it is so because they show it
visually. The same goes for Hals’s depiction of the rommelpot, which would also be overlapped
with a sort of knowledge-how alongside the depiction of the instrument because it depicts how it
is played. Finally, the knowledge that emerges from the Edelheere altarpiece is a personal
deduction resulting from my previous knowledge of Van der Weyden’s Deposition painting and
a quick cross-reference of dates.
The matter becomes even more complicated if we take into account the decay of
figuration in artistic practice since the late nineteenth century, as well as the emergence of the
avant-garde in early twentieth century, the popularization of abstraction in the 1940s and 1950s,
the development of conceptual art in the late 1960s, appropriation in the 1980s, and many other
movements in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In contemporary art, works
usually include several strategies, attitudes, and gestures as well as different mediums, making it
almost impossible to analyze them in a purely visual/figurative way.
For instance, contemporary artist Josiah McElheny has vindicated the use of
glassblowing in the production of art pieces. Glass, and more specifically glassblowing, has been
absent from mainstream contemporary art spaces in recent decades; however, McElheny caught
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international attention not only for his material choice, but also for his mastery of it and for the
new aesthetic experiences that his work provokes. One can say, given this context of artistic
production, that McElheny’s oeuvre presents us with different and experimental ways of looking
and appreciating the material (glass), thus acquiring some new understanding of the way glass
works (in reflection, for instance), and how it can be used and manipulated. McElheny’s works,
however, cannot be reduced to its visual and formal characteristics, for they emerge in a very
specific moment of contemporary art and offer a very specific discourse on the use of the
material, reflection, aesthetic experience, workshop production, etc.
When thinking about the possibilities of creating knowledge through contemporary
artistic practices, Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei comes to mind; he provides us with a
complex example of how a cognitive inquiry can be propitiated and performed by an artist. In
2008, Ai supported and organized an investigation aiming to compile a list of students, mostly
children, who died during the earthquake that hit the Chinese province of Sichuan on Monday,
May 12, 2008.8 Ai launched a public call for a “citizen’s investigation” because the Chinese
government had failed to provide an accurate list of the students killed by the earthquake.9 By
April 2009, he had compiled a list of nearly 5,500 students.10 This was, however, not only a

8

Ai Weiwei: Never Sorry, directed by Alison Klayman (2012), DVD.
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This case provides an example of an inquiry started and supported by an artist that
produced specific knowledge that, for any reason, was not produced otherwise (by the Chinese
government, for example).
10

Ai Weiwei, “5.12 Supplement to the List of Student Victims (Eighty-Four) 09.04.11,”
Ai Weiwei (blog), last modified April 14, 2009,
http://www.bullogger.com/blogs/aiww/archives/289730.aspx.
6

spontaneous act. Ai issued a new call for citizen’s investigation in November 2010 to identify the
victims of a fire that demolished a 28-floor tower block in Shanghai.11
In this particular case, it could be argued that Ai’s actions constitute activism and not
artistic production per se. However, as Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson point out, it has been
difficult for art historians to draw the limits of artistic authorship and what the artist’s oeuvre
archive should include:12 “if the author were the physical agent J. Bloggs, we should have to
count among Bloggs’s authorized works every doodle, every jotted diagram, that Bloggs left in
the world.”13 In the case of Ai’s citizen’s investigations, it is undeniable that they could be fused
into his artistic catalog because the majority of his works, produced and enunciated expressly as
art, also operate as a form of activism and social critique. Ai’s activism, whether materialized in
a work of art or not, cannot be separated from his practice as an artist.
A final example of the cognitive possibilities in contemporary art practice is provided by
the project SEFT-1 by Mexican artists Iván Puig and Andrés Padilla Domene. The SEFT-114
project, which was carried out from 2006 to 2011, consisted of the creation of a spatialized

11

Malcolm Moore, “Ai Weiwei Starts New Openness Campaign,” The Telegraph, last
modified November 25, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8159401/Ai-Weiwei-starts-newopenness-campaign.html.
12

Mieke Bal and Norman Bryson, “Semiotics and Art History: A Discussion of Context
and Senders,” in The Art of Art History, ed. Donald Preziosi (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2009), 253.
13

Ibid.
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“SEFT” stands for Manned Railway Exploration Probe (in Spanish Sonda de
Exploración Ferroviaria Tripulada).
7

[sic]15 vehicle that the artists used to explore the abandoned railway system in Mexico and
Ecuador.16 The aim of the project, according to Puig’s statement, was to collect data from the
landscapes through which the car toured, the experiences that the local people had with the
probe, and objects found along the way.17 SEFT-1, which has been exhibited in many Mexican
and international art spaces,18 is often displayed with the actual car (the probe), photographs, and
objects, and it is commonly accompanied by a book that describes the project. This book
includes several pictures, testimonies, and maps detailing the routes toured by the SEFT-1. The
project, then, became a sort of archaeological enterprise that exposed and documented the state
of abandonment and oblivion in which the once prosperous Mexican railway system exists today.
These examples show how specific knowledge can be generated as a result of an artistic
practice, but they also show that the state of this “cognitive production” through art is neither
generalized nor consistent; nay, they show that, in many cases, it might only be a secondary
outcome that is subsumed to the aesthetic experience with the art object.
Each one of these works, as well as others created by different artists, deserves a
specialized and in-depth analysis, for they entail complex entanglements of individual concerns,
social issues, political demands, cultural values, and the like. I am interested, however, in those

15

The project consists of a specialized vehicle that performs a spatial research of the
Mexican railway system. The creators often played with the idea that, with this project, they
were performing a “space travel;” Puig usually quotes writer Jorgé Luis Borges who said that
“all travel is spatial,” see Iván Puig, “SEFT-1,” Iván Puig’s Official Website, accessed March
2013, http://www.ivanpuig.net/seft.html.
16

Puig, “SEFT-1.”

17

Ibid.

18

Recently this project was featured in the Eighteenth International Symposium on
Electronic Art ISEA2012, in Albuquerque, NM.
8

artworks that are consciously presented as artifacts that contest, expose, or reframe “content” that
is otherwise conceived of as just fact, information, or knowledge. These works could operate as a
critical out-of-the-field lens that can provide a critical posture towards, in this case, other
organized forms of knowledge production. In these lines, I am particularly interested in the
relationship between contemporary artistic practice and scientific knowledge production and
enunciation.
Usually scientific knowledge is transmitted in visual forms that aim to facilitate its
understanding. I am going to acknowledge the historical and inherent relationship between
science and visual representation, but for the purpose of this analysis, I will focus on productions
that have been intended and enunciated as art pieces deliberately designed to reframe and
ultimately expand on knowledge that has been generated from the scientific perspective.
I believe that some works of art, regardless of the artist’s personal acquisition of knowledge,
could serve as an expansion of particular knowledge that has been previously enunciated in other
realms or, in an ideal way, derived strictly from the artwork itself. These types of artworks are
usually contemporary productions that retake previous forms of knowledge in order to
reformulate them or offer alternative cognitive perspectives to them.
I have chosen a single work of art from which I will examine the relationship between art
and science and the possibilities of the former in expanding the enunciation of the latter. This
work is Eclipses for Austin, created by Mexican artist Pablo Vargas Lugo for the Blanton
Museum of Art at the University of Texas in Austin, Texas. The artwork serves as an exemplar
of the relationships between art and science, for it contains knowledge that has been expressly
produced from a scientific enterprise, astronomy, but at the same time is re-framed and re-
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interpreted in order to generate a different experience with it. Science is here my point of
departure and comparison with art for it is regarded as the main form of knowledge production.
Eclipses for Austin
During the summer of 2012, I participated in a seminar offered by the Jumex Foundation
in Mexico City and taught by Úrsula Dávila-Villa, who was then interim curator for Latin
American art at the Blanton Museum in Austin, Texas. The focus of the seminar was museum
and gallery practices and, to this end, Dávila-Villa shared with us some of the projects in which
she participated at the Blanton Museum as curator or organizer. During one of the sessions, she
showed us a project that, for her, was an exemplar of interdepartmental participation within the
University of Texas, because it involved people from the museum and from the athletic, video,
music, and astronomy departments, as well as a host of volunteers for its realization. This
artwork was Eclipses for Austin, commissioned by the Blanton Museum to Mexican artist Pablo
Vargas Lugo.
The artwork was developed under the WorkSpace program, an initiative of the Blanton
Museum, to create a space of experimentation for emerging and established artists both in Latin
America and the United States. The curator in charge of developing this particular project was
Úrsula Dávila-Villa, who personally selected the artist and worked with him on the project
during a process that took more than a year to complete.
Eclipses for Austin is an artwork that recreates and simulates the next four solar eclipses
that will be visible from the area of Austin, Texas. The four eclipses represented will take place
in April 8, 2024; April 14, 2200; July 17, 2205; and February 25, 2343, respectively (Figures 1
and 2). Each of the four eclipses represented consisted of an animation created through cardstunt performances that involved nearly 200 people at UT's Darrel K. Royal Texas Memorial
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Stadium. The recreations of the four solar eclipses were performed on October 6, 2009. The
participants flipped yellow and black cards to recreate the image of the sun being eclipsed by the
transit of the moon. The performances were videotaped and displayed at the museum on four TV
screens from November 14, 2009 to February 21, 2010 (Figures 3 and 4). The display of the
work also featured a news-like stand that contained several copies of a brochure entitled Sun
(Figures 3, 5 and 15); this brochure resembles a periodical publication and served as
communication of the events to the general public. For each performance, the artist worked with
percussionist Eric Peterson to create a soundtrack for each eclipse representation in order to reincorporate the element of temporality to the phenomenon.
The Artist: Pablo Vargas Lugo
Pablo Vargas Lugo was born in Mexico City, Mexico, in 1968, where he currently lives
and works. He graduated from the National School of Plastic Arts of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (UNAM) in 1993. He has participated in solo and collective exhibitions
since the early 1990s in Mexico as well as internationally. Vargas Lugo was part of the National
System of Creators of Mexico from 2004 to 2007. He has been artist in residence in places like
New Delhi, Stockholm, and New York, and also curated the exhibition, “The Smoked Mirror,”
in New Delhi, India, in 2003. His work has been part of important public collections such as the
Museo de Arte de Lima in Lima, Peru; Museo Carrillo Gil, Museo Universitario de Arte
Contemporáneo (MUAC), Museo de Arte Moderno, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
[Foreign Affairs Ministry] and Jumex Foundation in Mexico; and the Los Angeles County
Museum of Art (LACMA), the Blanton Museum, and the Houston Museum of Fine Arts in the
United States, among other institutions and museums.
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Eclipses, stars, astronomy, music, time, and collectiveness are recurrent themes in Vargas
Lugo’s oeuvre. As is stated in the official dossier provided by LABOR gallery:
The work of Pablo Vargas Lugo takes elements from various disciplines, such as
astronomy, cartography or archaeology. Making drawings, sculptures, paintings and
installations, he develops visual and conceptual games that refer to language, to
measurement conventions, to millenary traditions.19
In Reloj I, II and III (2003) (Figure 13), for instance, Vargas Lugo created a video
triptych consisting of three monitors, each displaying a digital clock that keeps time differently
from the other two. For this piece, Vargas Lugo stated that he was “interested in the idea of
dividing time into prime numbers, that is, numbers that can’t be evenly divided by other whole
numbers,” and that he “wanted to contradict the idea of an eternally divisible time by creating a
time that consists of regular but indivisible units.”20 As is exemplified in this work, his
explorations often reflect a philosophical and ontological consideration of the possibilities of
measurement, truth, observation, science, and time.
For the work Bonampak News (2005 to 2006) (Figure 8), Vargas Lugo created a set of
newspapers containing ancient Mayan hieroglyphs, which were displayed on the floor of the
gallery: “This piece establishes a paradoxical dialogue between the recent and the ancient, which
is activated by the physical distance between the viewer and the piece. As in other works he has
produced in recent years, Vargas Lugo strives here to create an image of time and the values we
use to grasp it.”21 In Sombras para estrellas y algunos eclipses [Shadows for Stars and Some
Eclipses] (Figures 6 and 7), from 2007 to 2008, he draws “representations of these astral
19

LABOR, “Pablo Vargas Lugo,” (Dossier, Mexico City, 2012), 3.

20

Rubén Gallo, “Pablo Vargas Lugo,” in BOMB 94 (Winter, 2006),
http://bombsite.com/issues/94/articles/2778.
21

LABOR, “Pablo Vargas Lugo,” 35.
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phenomena onto paper and cardboard collages, using ephemeral or discarded objects to
materialize millenarian celestial bodies that usually escape imagination.”22
One of Vargas Lugo’s most famous works is Serie Fortuna (2008) (Figure 9 and 10), in
which he recreated a “cartographically precise”23 stellar map using antique coins over a surface
of felt. In this piece, Vargas Lugo played “with the idea of Fortune both in its minted form and as
that which, according to astrology, is written in the stars and determines the day-to-day course of
events.”24 It is worth noting that, in the placement of the coins (representing stars and galaxies),
Vargas Lugo has overlapped some of them in order to create small eclipses (Figure 11); this
same strategy using coins to represent solar eclipses is repeated in Trayectoria de eclipses
[Eclipses Trajectory] (Figure 14) from 2009.
In Eclipses for Austin, Vargas Lugo “notes the relationship between eclipses and sporting
events in terms of collective observation and ritual practice. This perceived connection led to his
decision to stage his new piece in the UT Stadium, an arena that frequently serves as a site for
collective identity building and communal excitement.”25 This work, then, is not the start of an
exploration but the culmination of a specific inquiry regarding solar eclipses, time,
collectiveness, and image creation.
Vargas Lugo’s work often shows an extremely calculated work production, both
intellectually and materially. When discussing his artwork Intemperie (2012) (Figure 12), a large

22

Ibid., 45.

23

Ibid., 50.

24

Ibid.

25

“Pablo Vargas Lugo,” e-flux.com, last modified December 4, 2009, http://www.eflux.com/announcements/pablo-vargas-lugo/.
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rug made from layers of colored sand, Leslie Castro highlighted Vargas Lugo’s outstanding
technical precision, which also was evident in Eclipses for Austin in 2009.26 Curator Dávila-Villa
confirmed Castro’s commentary on Vargas Lugo’s work, when she stated that he often works
and thinks “as a scientist,”27 and that he does not leave almost any element to chance.28
This brief survey of Vargas Lugo’s work shows that he is an artist concerned with
specific themes and motifs. His focus on time, stars, and eclipses demonstrates that his oeuvre
explores our understanding of them. Works like Serie Fortuna (2008), and Trayectoria de
eclipses (2009) are direct precedents of his interest in solar eclipses.
Thesis Preview
Harpagon. (À Mariane) Ne vous offensez pas, ma belle, si je viens à vous avec des lunettes. Je
sais que vos appas frappent assez les yeux, sont assez visibles d'eux-mêmes, et qu'il n'est pas
besoin de lunettes pour les apercevoir; mais enfin c'est avec des lunettes qu'on observe les
astres.29
~Molière, L'Avare [The Miser], Scène V
My first encounter with Vargas Lugo’s work coincided with my increasing interest in
observations of the sky and stars. Observation is the key term here. For James O. Young, for
instance, “art and empirical science have a common foundation: both begin with careful
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observation.”30 In the excerpt from Molière’s Miser quoted above, Harpagon refers to the way
astronomers utilize lenses to observe the stars as a metaphor for also using glasses in order to
observe Mariane, the young lady on whom he has laid his eyes.
In the early seventeenth century, Galileo published his Sidereus Nuncius [Starry
Messenger] where, under the section entitled as “Stellar Observations,” he shows the diagrams
that he drew as a result of his observations of Jupiter’s four moons, a fundamental proof on the
reaffirmation of the heliocentric model of the universe. If we agree with Young, regarding
observation as the common foundation of both science and art, why have both disciplines been so
distant from each other in regard to the outcome derived from observation?
According to Chris Jenks, observation in science “drags behind it an excess baggage of
ontological and epistemological assumptions,”31 for it has shaped the understanding of the self
and the other that prevails in social and cultural research, and has led to the idea of objectivity.32
These assumptions are, I think, evident when the term is used indistinctly to signify empirical
verification. Especially in astronomy, where its object of study is so distant, big, and
unreachable, observation is not only the metaphor of the empirical practice in this field, but the
actual method that is used in most astronomical research.33 In aesthetic theory, on the other hand,
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Hegel suggested that vision is privileged over other senses for it implies a detachment from the
object, hence fostering a purely theoretical (intellectual) relationship with objects.34
Why is observation the privileged sense and why is it so central to both art and science,
yet considered so significantly different in each of the fields? One might doubt that observation
is essential to contemporary artistic practice, but a closer look at some works by contemporary
artists will confirm that it is still central to the field (even when it is not acknowledged). When
asked, in Cantanker Magazine, the question, “in one word, what do you find inspiring and what
challenging?” Vargas Lugo answered “Observation, Observation.” 35 Probably this is also
because, according to Castro’s36 and Dávilla-Villa’s37 accounts of Vargas Lugo’s practice, he
thinks and behaves as a scientist.
In this thesis, I will explore the possibilities of knowledge through contemporary artistic
practices. Utilizing the work Eclipses for Austin by Vargas Lugo as my starting point, I will
discover which discourses emerge from contemporary works that expand on scientific
knowledge and understanding.
In Chapter 2, I start with a brief survey of different perspectives regarding the
possibilities of knowledge through art, from the classical philosophical standpoints to
contemporary approaches. Later, I will outline some premises and tenets that drive scientific
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inquiry, as well as the necessity of science to be communicated publicly and, more importantly,
visually. Thus, I will highlight the role of visual communication in scientific communication. In
order to understand the contribution of Eclipses for Austin to knowledge, I will describe the
specificities of the astronomical approach to solar eclipses, since I will compare and contrast
Vargas Lugo’s work with the scientific account of this natural phenomenon.
Departing from this specific work of art, I attempt to understand how contemporary art
addresses, questions, or contests scientific knowledge and its premises. My research questions
are, then: What are contemporary artistic practices generating when they rearticulate scientific
means of knowledge production and enunciation? What rhetorical discourses emerge from these
practices as a response to expand on scientific knowledge?
In general, I consider contemporary artistic practices as statements, attitudes, and
positions taken by the artists towards certain issues and subjects. For this analysis, I will regard
Vargas Lugo’s work as a rhetorical artifact created as a response to a very specific need that is
constructed by the difference and divergence between artistic practice and science. Art qua
rhetorical work can be analyzed rhetorically in order to unveil the underlying discourses that it is
proposing as a way of, in this case, reformulating and expanding on scientific knowledge. In this
regard, Chapter 3 details my methodology, which consists of identifying and describing the
elements of exigence, constraints, and fitting response, following the idea of the rhetorical
situation as proposed by rhetorical critic Lloyd F. Bitzer.38
In my analysis, I will identify the aspects of the rhetorical situation in the production and
enunciation of Vargas Lugo’s piece. I will consider every aspect of the work, from the
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performances, to the use of video; from the display in the gallery, to the production of the Sun
brochure, as well as rely on other documents related to the exhibition and the artist, and on
personal interviews I have conducted both with the artist and the curator Dávila-Villa.
I would like to stress the importance of specifics in my analysis of this piece, as I will
compare Vargas Lugo’s work with the astronomical/scientific account of solar eclipses.
Astronomy and astrophysics, the specific sciences that I will collate with Vargas Lugo’s practice,
as Molière’s Harpagon observes, utilize lenses to approach and visually reach the celestial bodies
that inhabit the sky; however, the use of lenses could be also prejudicial to observation. As Joan
Fontcuberta points out, to speculate derives from the Latin speculum39 (mirror), which originally
meant to observe the stars through the use of mirrors.40 To consider, as well, has a sidereal origin
for it meant, according to Fontcuberta, to observe the totality of the stars (sidus = star).41 Hence,
Fontcuberta suggests that an interesting paradox emerges from the very idea of observation: the
dichotomy of both considering and speculating as subjective activities as opposed to
observation, which is supposedly objective. Is it possible that the difference between art and
science derives from the divergence in which observation is used? Has art devoted its practice to
speculation, whereas science has stayed with mere observation?

39

This word is the root of the Spanish espejo, the Catalan espill and the Italian specchio.
See Joan Fontcuberta, El beso de Judas: fotografía y verdad (Barcelona: G. Gili, 1997), 39.
40

Fontcuberta, El beso de Judas, 39.

41

Ibid.
18

CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
When I say that artworks have cognitive values, I mean that, like scientific hypotheses and
historical narratives, artworks can provide an understanding of aspects of reality.
~James O. Young, Art and Knowledge42
What will be the shape of the new manner of understanding required by our future? I believe that
artists are the harbingers of the future mentality required both by science and by the imperatives
of living in our precarious times.
~Arthur Zajonc, Light and Cognition43
Knowing the universe is inventing the universe.
~Luc Brisson and F. Walter Meyerstein, Inventing the Universe44
Conceiving artistic practice as inquiry and the artistic object as a source of/means to
achieve knowledge is a rough, nay extremely complex, enterprise. The idea of knowledge
through art has been supported and contested by several theorists, philosophers, art historians,
and artists throughout history. Before focusing on the specificities of Pablo Vargas Lugo’s work,
I will first attempt to draw a general panorama of some of the most important postures on the
relationship between art and knowledge. In this first section, I will focus on the following texts:
Plato’s Republic; Aristotle’s Poetics; Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment; and, finally, G. W.
Friedrich Hegel’s Aesthetics. Later, I will describe some general contemporary perspectives on
the possibilities of knowledge through art and the conception of artistic practice as a form of
inquiry. In this section, I will draw the first connections, similarities and differences, between art
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and science. As I contrast and compare both disciplines, I will briefly describe the main premises
of scientific knowledge and its public enunciation through visual communication. Finally, I will
focus on the specific knowledge of solar eclipses as framed and enunciated by science in
astronomy and astrophysics.
Classical and Historical Perspectives on Knowledge in Art
Although the cognitive component of art may be found (or argued) in art’s different
dimensions,45 probably the oldest discussions on the matter have been so when art is conceived
qua figurative representation. In this case, the key concept to be considered is mimêsis,46 the
definition of which although entailing imitation and emulation/simulation, should not be reduced
merely to these.47 Each author’s personal account of how mimêsis operates is crucial to
understand his or her position regarding the possibility of knowledge through art; however, not
all authors make use of this term even when the focus of their work is indeed concerned with the
relationship between the artistic object and what it stands for. In this sense, as will be seen, the
term representation is often used as a synonym for mimêsis. In any case, I stress the importance
of having an understanding of mimêsis beyond imitation and, certainly, broader than
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representation, such that it may signify also a re-enunciation of nature, a way of approaching
reality, a mode of artistic inquiry, etc.48
Plato and the Copying of Ideas
The debate on whether art has any cognitive value may be traced back to the texts of
Plato and Aristotle. Plato discussed the legitimacy of different types of representation in his
Republic (outlined in books two and three and detailed in the 10th), where he rejects any benign
feature in representation insofar as a form of re-cognition of reality. Imitation and figuration,
Plato would suggest, move us away from reality. This idea departs from Plato’s metaphysical
philosophy of ideas and forms. He thought that the perceived world was imperfect and errant and
that there was a more perfect realm inhabited by ideas and forms as eternal, unchanging, and
transcendent entities.49 In this sense, perceived objects are just imperfect versions of eternal
ideas. Thus, mimêsis in the arts represents a moving away from the idea to give importance to
the copy. Art would be, then, a representation of an already errant version of an idea. For Plato, it
is the appearance of what is being represented in figuration and not its essence or its truth; the
artist is then just an imitator.50
-‐ Then consider this very point: What does painting do in each case? Does it imitate that
which is as it is, or does it imitate that which appears as it appears? Is it an imitation of
appearances or of truth?
-‐ Of appearances.
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-‐ Then imitation is far removed from the truth, for it touches only a small part of each
thing and a part that is itself only an image.51
Plato’s mimêsis is, apparently, indistinguishable from imitation. He would refuse, then,
any possibility of knowledge through art.52 Some later writings and critiques of Plato’s aesthetics
stressed the fact that the philosopher focused mostly on arguments against poetry when he
referred to art. However, and following Bruce Aune, the Greek word poiêsis means indeed
poetry as well as other forms of creation.53 The above quote demonstrates that Plato also
contemplated visual forms of artistic creation to support his ideas.
Catharsis as Learning in Aristotle’s Poetics
Aristotle, contrary to Plato, shows himself more acquiescent about mimêsis, for he
adjudges some legitimacy to representation. He saw imitation to be natural to humans; in fact,
for him it is the medium through which one encounters reality: “first, the instinct of imitation is
implanted in man from childhood, one difference between him and other animals being that he is
the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learns his earliest lessons; and no
less universal is the pleasure felt in things imitated.”54
Regarding the arts, Aristotle finds mimêsis to be selective in terms of what it represents,
thus educative, and furthermore, useful for a cognitive approach to reality.55 This is why

51

Ibid.

52

Furthermore, Plato discusses the nature of knowledge in other works, such as in the
Theaetetus, where he premises that “knowledge is nothing other than perception.”
53

Bruce Aune, “Plato’s Objections to Mimetic Art,” last modified February 11, 1998,
http://www.umass.edu/philosophy/PDF/Aune/PlatoonMimArt.pdf.
54

Aristotle, The Poetics of Aristotle, trans. S. H. Butcher (Penn State Electronic Classics
Series Publication, 2000), http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/aristotl/poetics.pdf, 7.
55

Ibid., 7-9.
22

Aristotle’s conception of drama as educative is not surprising. For Aristotle, tragedy’s ultimate
goal is catharsis, “the purification or purgation of the emotions aroused in a tragic
performance.”56 Therefore, moral learning is a main purpose of artistic representation.
Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete, and of a certain
magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several kinds
being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action, not of narrative; through
pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.57
Tragedy is, for Aristotle, an art of imitating (mimetizing) actions in order to achieve
catharsis. Aristotle believed that there is something inherently cognitive in the enactment of
actions that makes us perceive something from reality and, therefore, learn. When seeing the
action happening, the audience learns broader possibilities of moral action. This is made possible
only by drama, for “what has not happened we do not at once feel sure to be possible.”58 In this
sense, Aristotle would stress, specific names and places in dramatic representation are not
important,59 for what is learned is the moral value of catharsis.
Kant and the Aesthetic Experience as Ultimate Goal
In the eighteenth century, after the consolidation of fine arts as we know them, Kant’s
philosophy had a great impact on the way art was conceived and experienced. For Kant, the
artistic experience and judgment of taste are independent of any interest.60 Artistic experience,
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deprived from all further interest, suggests just an experience of delight from the artistic
encounter and, therefore, neither desire nor cognition of what it is being represented.61 All the
more so, for Kant, delight is shadowed by interest and desire when the importance of the real
existence of the object represented comes to concern the viewer.62 For him, “one must not be in
the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete
indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of judge in matters of taste.”63 Subtly, Kant
expresses his conception of art as purely figurative and based on nature; however, as shown in
the previous quote, he dismisses the possibility of mimêsis as means to approach the objects of
representation, insofar as its status of existent/non-existent.
Kant recognizes the faculty of knowledge as the mere theoretical understanding of
nature.64 It is noticeable that Kant constrains knowledge (almost equaling it) to understanding,
for he subsumes knowledge to the comprehension of the a priori laws of nature that prescribe
cognitive laws.65 Kant’s distinction of delight from knowledge is evident when he states that the
judgment of taste when confronting a work of art is not logical but rather subjective; hence, Kant
discredits any cognitive value, not from representation itself, but from the artistic experience as
an aesthetic event.
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Hegel and the Progression of Modes of Representation
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Hegel’s philosophy gave closure to the early
modern stage of aesthetics and art philosophy. Although similar to Plato’s concepts of ideas and
forms, the singularity of Hegel’s theory lies in the idea that the specific form that the ideal takes
could be mapped historically in the development of the arts across cultures. Hence, even when
Hegel does not focus on the nature of mimêsis itself, he is concerned historically with the
relationship between form and idea and sign and content. In this sense, when experiencing a
work of art, the type of relationship between form and idea that is being shown could unveil,
according to Hegel, the historicity of the work of art.
The relationship between the individual form and idea is what determines the type of art
that the object embodies. Hegel made this distinction in three particular forms of art: Symbolic,
Classical and Romantic.66 Hegel placed these three forms of art on a historical timeline.
Symbolic art, for instance, would be pre-art (Vorkunst). In it, form and ideal are
disproportionate, hence being a form of representation that has not been totally developed.
Stephen Houlgate summarized Hegel’s types of art this way: “It falls short of ideal beauty when
it takes the form of symbolic art, and it goes beyond such beauty when it takes the form
of romantic art. The form of art that is characterized by works of ideal beauty itself
is classical art.”67
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It is important to note, however, that for Hegel, the ultimate and essential function of art
is to free the human spirit: “The point of art, therefore, is not to be ‘realistic’—to imitate or
mirror the contingencies of everyday life—but to show us what divine and human freedom look
like.”68 Hegel’s standpoint on knowledge, therefore, is risky to describe: on the one hand, the
ideals of beauty and spirit dominate his philosophy of art but, at the same time, his approach
inherently supposes that art can unveil certain (historical) relations regarding the operation of
representation. Evidently, his historic timeline69 is highly debatable but, at least, it acknowledges
the historic production of a specific form of mimêsis.
I have broadly described the debate about the cognitive value in art as it has been posed
throughout history by several authors and thinkers. It is worth noting that the different postures
explained in this first section have very specific conceptions of the arts, and that these
philosophers drew conclusions based on their general idea of what art is; hence, particular cases
and non-representational art are often left aside. If there is to be a knowledge component in
artistic practice, I think it should be analyzed in specific works of art, taking into account the
context of each work’s enunciation. A fifteenth-century Flemish painting would convey historic
information to the versed art historian today, but what information was transmitted when it was
produced? What inquiries or concerns did the artist fulfill with this work? What specific
perception of reality did this work’s audiences have when encountering it? These are elements
that should not be left aside when addressing the “knowledge question” in art.70
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Finally, as previously stated, these approaches are concerned only with the figurative
dimension of art, with mimêsis. As art, in a general sense, moved away from figuration during
the past two centuries, the topic of cognition through art, as well as its (in)equivalence to other
forms of knowledge construction (viz. science), should be rephrased and restated. Today, artistic
practice is a form of inquiry, and artists working more and more within interdisciplinary settings
(moving away from the studio) constitute a contemporary dimension on this matter that should
be also considered as a way of knowing.
Contemporary Perspectives on Knowledge in Art
In contemporary scholarship, the topic of the knowledge possibilities in art has taken
many shapes and has involved the consideration of art’s different stages, from the artwork itself,
to artistic practice as inquiry, to art as an educational tool, to transdisciplinary collaboration
between artists and researchers, etc. However, there are more or less generalized ideas that have
concerned recent scholars when thinking about art and knowledge. In this chapter, I will give a
brief survey of these contemporary perspectives on the possibility of knowledge through artistic
practice.
Rethinking Representation as a Way of Knowing
James O. Young, professor and chair of the Philosophy department at the University of
Victoria in Victoria, BC, Canada, published Art and Knowledge in 2001, in which he discusses
the cognitive value of art and its possibilities as a form of inquiry. This text represents one of the
main books written on the matter in recent years, and it is my point of departure for surveying
contemporary perspectives on art and cognition.
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The first topic that Young addresses is knowledge through visual representation. Young’s ideas
are based on recurrent comparisons between artistic representation and the enunciation of
scientific knowledge by describing the difference between what he calls semantic representations
and illustrations.71 For Young, semantic representations are true statements that rely on
conventions, but these conventions are not merely linguistic:72
A graph can represent, say, the growth of a city’s population over time. It can do so only
because certain conventions have been adopted. Without these conventions, it would not
be possible to use the length of a bar on the graph to represent a city’s population during
a given year. Rules exist for transforming the information stored in a graph into
statements.73
Illustrations, on the other hand, are specific and particular cases that could not become
statements. For Young, in general, science conveys knowledge through semantic representations,
whereas art does it via illustration. He emphasizes, however, that these are not absolute
distinctions.74 Young stresses later that art provides knowledge by focusing on particularity and
specificity (as opposed to science), and that is where the cognitive value of art is possible: “Arts
provide what I will call a perspective on objects. A perspective is a way of conceiving an object
that can enhance the understanding of the object.”75
It is important for Young to highlight the notion that the way in which art provides
knowledge varies significantly from that of science. One way that art achieves this is by directing
our attention to a particular perspective: “They [illustrations] can direct the attention of audience
71
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members and nudge them into a position from where they can recognize the rightness of a
perspective on some object or objects.”76 Besides acknowledging that art can teach practical
knowledge (how to perform an action), Young states that knowledge in art through
representation could be propositional77 when it shows cases as opposed to universalities, which
are pursued by science:
I believe that artworks can provide propositional knowledge. That is, they can teach us
that something is the case. For example, in reading Pride and Prejudice one learns that
first impressions are a poor guide to character, that it is dangerous to delight in making
sport of one’s acquaintances, and so on.78
Young suggests, also, that both art and science, by providing different approaches to
knowledge, are also more or less suitable to specific issues, i.e. they cannot operate equally in
conveying knowledge of the same things in the same way:
The first point to make is that some matters are best understood by means of the arts,
while others lend themselves to scientific treatment. Theories and rational demonstration
are of little use in understanding matters such as the difference between sadness and
grief, the forms hypocrisy can assume, and the dangers of a heartless educational system.
On the other hand, illustrative demonstration is unlikely to shed much light on matters
such as the causes of global warming, whether Homo sapiens is descended from
Australopithecus or the emotions of celestial bodies.79
By the end of his book, Young discusses the cognitive value of art produced during and
after the twentieth century as a result of avant-garde movements. His ideas are particularly
relevant for my analysis since many premises in contemporary art can be traced and are
indubitably heirs to the early twentieth-century avant-garde. Young states that avant-garde
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artworks “can contribute little to knowledge” and that given they “generally have little cognitive
value, they generally have little aesthetic value”80 as well.
After supporting the idea that heterogeneous movements (such as Dada, Cubism,
Futurism, Expressionism, Pop, etc.) may be included under the category of “avant-garde style,”81
Young’s main argument against the epistemological value in these works could be summarized
by his account of Warhol’s Campbell’s soup cans:
A Warhol picture of a soup can is an illustrative representation of a soup can. This fact
about the picture is, however, largely beside the point. The important feature of a Warhol
picture of soup cans is that it is intended to represent something besides soup cans. It can
only do so in conjunction with a body of discourse (that is, semantic representations).82
It is clear that for Young, art that relies, to any degree, on discourse and conceptual (nonrepresentational) conventions, which he calls discourse-dependent artworks, have little to offer
to knowledge in contrast to those works that, through representation, show that, as he says,
something is the case.
New Relationships between Art and Science
The avant-garde, however, is the precedent of emergent relationships that artists
established with other disciplines during the second half of the twentieth century. By the end of
the 1960s, as Marga Bijvoet comprehensively summarized, artists were increasingly interested in
exploring the inclusion of science and new technologies in their work.83 These tendencies led
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theorists, art historians, and critics to continuously and systematically compare/contrast both
practices (science and art) in terms of their processes, inquiries, outcomes, and mutual
contributions. The debate, then, regarding the cognitive possibilities of art, away from the
emphasis on figuration, obtained a whole new shape.
The intersection between art and science as well as their integration is, for Bijvoet, also a
result of two main factors: the action-reaction logic that prevailed in most twentieth-century
artistic movements (a heritage of the avant-garde);84 and the transformation of scientific
knowledge, its principles and concepts by the beginning of the twentieth century, which caught
the attention and intellectual interest of the artists, thus making evident the influence of the
scientific thought in the arts.85
The attitudes toward these new relationships and collaborations between art, science, and
technology have been heterogeneous and even dissident, ranging from highly optimistic, like the
Art and Technology Movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s,86 to critically reluctant, like
Jane Livingston’s comments on LACMA’s Art and Technology Program.87 In any case, the
interest on behalf of scholars and critics to understand these relations has been evident and
numerous.
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The first major issue that these art forms posited was to create a common vocabulary,
previously nonexistent,88 to be used in order to refer to them and approach them theoretically.
For instance, Christiane Paul stresses the hazardous enterprise of using definitions such as new
media or electronic art, and she observes that “the successful evasion of definitions is one of
new media art’s greatest assets and a main reason why so many artists, curators, and practitioners
in general are attracted to this art form.”89 Critic, curator, and scholar Itsuo Sakane prefers and
has been consistently utilizing the term science-arts (over media or technological arts) because it
entails a broader understanding of what artists are doing when including new technologies and
scientific knowledge to their work.90
I have the strong feeling that we should not only include new technological artwork, but
also new artforms which have been made possible by the introduction of a new “world
vision.” This includes knowledge gained from observing nature and the universe gained
from new scientific discoveries since the last century. This is more than just the
application of new scientific technology, but is based on a new way of looking at the
time-space concept, a new cosmic view, and a new view of nature which is being
influenced by a new scientific concept today.91
The Artist as Knower
Despite the specific terminology that is used by scholars and critics to label the
integration between art, science, and technology, there are considerations on the matter that are
commonly identified. The first one is the equalization between the figure of the artist and that of
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the scientist/researcher, pointing out similarities between their processes, inquiries, and results
and placing them in levels of knowledge production that are similar. Artists Christa Sommerer
and Laurent Mignonneau summarize this idea when they state that
Creation is no longer understood as expression of the artist’s inner creativity or
“ingenium” (according to Hegel) but becomes itself an intrinsically dynamic process that
represents the interaction between the human observer, his/her consciousness and the
evolutionary dynamic and complex image processes of the works.92
The shift of focus from the art object to the artistic process, which led to understanding
the role of the artist as similar to that of the scientist, has been noted by scholars93 as well as by
artists as prevailing in most late-twentieth-century artistic movements. Artists, then, were
conceived also as researchers. For instance, both electrical engineer Billy Klüver and artist
Robert Rauschenberg,94 by 1970, considered that artists had acquired new social and
environmental responsibilities that required an interdisciplinary collaboration with scientists and
technicians.95
The idea of the artist as researcher and as knower implies not only that he/she is an
individual learning while producing the artwork but, also, that the artist generates knowledge
that, through the work of art, can be inserted in the sphere of knowledge production and, hence,
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be communicated. In this regard, Hilde Hein, when writing about the Exploratorium,96 states, for
instance, that
The works that artists produce shape our apprehension of the world just as the discoveries
of science do. Art helps us to see and hear and feel the world, and sometimes to
conceptualize it. Artists are expert perceivers. They often show us phenomena that we
have failed to note before, and reveal them with such indisputable definition that science
is thereafter compelled to explore and understand them. Artists give us the world with an
immediacy unobtainable by science, but no less than scientists, artists are bound by
canons of testing and experimentation.97
Hein, later, says that the Exploratorium exhibits both works of science and art as equal,
thus denying “the preeminence of one over the other or even a sharp distinction between them.”98
By the end of her analysis, describing the piece Sun Painting by Robert Miller,99 created in the
venue, Hein poses the question of whether Miller is an artist or a scientist.100
Performing a similar comparison between the artist and the scientist, Jeffrey Shaw points
out that “the activity of both art and science has always been the interpretation and recreation of
reality. It is an exercise of the human imagination, creating virtual realities that embody tentative
structures of meaning.”101 Simon Werret even suggests that “there is nothing inherent in actions
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to designate them as artistic or scientific” and that “these identities come to be via a process of
social negotiation, in which techniques emerge, stabilize, and may then endure as media, art or
experiments.”102
As an interesting gesture, Stephen Wilson, in the introduction to his comprehensive
anthology on the intersections between art, science and technology, presents a quiz where he lists
real projects, works, or activities and invites the reader “to determine which activities have been
carried out by persons describing themselves as artists and which by those describing themselves
as researchers.”103 By doing this, Wilson suggests that the practice of both artists and scientists
are similar as they are both forms of inquiry and investigation.
Probably the best example of a contemporary104 overlap between the arts and sciences in
a single individual is Frank Malina, aeronautical engineer and painter who founded the renowned
peer-reviewed journal Leonardo in 1968, which focuses on scholar research on the intersections
between art, science and technology. Leonardo’s importance and impact, as well as the figure of
Malina, has been constantly highlighted and pointed out as a case of success of these relations.105
The perspectives equating the artistic and the scientific practice, often vindicate the
historical relations that both disciplines have had in order to support the argument of both being,
102
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not only similar, but inherently interrelated from the beginning. Wilson makes the argument that
since the Paleolithic era and until the Renaissance, there is a blurry distinction between arts and
science, and that the idea of both as clearly separate fields could be dated back to the end of the
nineteenth century.106
Interesting examples of this historical vindication are, to give some examples, Siegfried
Zielinski’s Deep Time of the Media, where he describes his archaeological approach to media
and media arts history, and the book Artists as Inventors, Inventors as Artists, edited by Dieter
Daniels and Barbara U. Schmidt, in which the intricate historical relationships between art and
science are drawn and highlighted, especially from the late nineteenth century to the present day.
In the latter, Simon Penny, for example, focuses on new media works, which he calls machineartworks, that become instruments that operate as “a device which is employed to generate an
aesthetic artifact.”107 In this case, the parallelism between artist and scientist is given by
conceiving the new media artwork as a form of invention108 and, therefore, the process of
producing it as a kind of experimentation. However, as Penny also states, the new media artist
working in an established research setting, where he/she is in contact with other practitioners, is
often a sinuous enterprise. He notes that “machine-artwork research is often guided by
motivations which appear absurd by instrumental criteria,”109 thus, disregarded by scientists and
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researchers “as prototypes, as mock-ups, proofs-in-principle, strange kludges of available
technologies.”110
Artists Involved in Transdisciplinary Research Projects
The second main perspective on the contribution of art is the involvement of artists
within research settings. These practices have exposed the transdisciplinary approach that these
projects often require. Although transdisciplinary is an adjective often applied to these practices,
it should be used cautiously, for it implies certain connotations that determine the way the
collaboration is being (or should be) done. In a recent article by Martin Tröndle, in which he
describes the costs and benefits of a transdisciplinary project within an artistic environment,111 he
observes that “the degree of integration of participating disciplines and fields can serve as a
distinguishing feature between multi-, inter- and transdisciplinarity,”112 thus stressing the
complexity of the use of these terms. In general, transdisciplinary research requires going beyond
the “normal conceptions of scientific disciplines,” as it “tries to integrate and synthesize many
different disciplinary perspectives.”113 But the main goal in transdisciplinary research is often
equally shared by all the disciplines involved. In comparison, multidisciplinary research
“approaches an issue from the perceptions of a range of disciplines; but each discipline works in
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a self-contained manner with little cross-fertilization among disciplines, or synergy in the
outcomes.”114 All these different ways of collaborating (and its many hybridizations) seem to
occur in spaces dedicated to the integration of the arts, science, and technology.
According to Bijvoet, “equal collaboration” could be said to be the flag of the first
attempts of transdisciplinary coupling between the arts and science.115 The aim of places like
Experiments in Art and Technology (EAT) or the Center for Advanced Visual Studies at MIT,
was to provide a space of mutual dialogue between artists and engineers, and between artists and
researchers respectively.116 In both cases, the role that any of its participants should have had
was, supposedly, to be equally important (and credited) in substance. However, the level of
engagement and commitment from either side was, as expected, not always as fluid as claimed.
Artist and researcher Michael Naimark, for instance, when describing his personal
experiences encountered in several research settings (MIT, Atari, Apple, etc.), highlights the
differences in thinking and expectations that still exist between artists and engineers, scientists
and organizational entrepreneurs, which lead to inevitable barriers in the process of achieving
mutual enrichment.117 These differences may lead to unsuccessful collaboration projects that are
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later disregarded. As a result, both artists and researchers may become doubtful of the benefits of
such collaboration.
Tröndle outlines three main factors that occur as obstacles when these transdisciplinary
connections are sought. First, “the understanding of collaboration with artists rarely goes beyond
the idea of making scientific diagrams ‘prettier,’” hence showing a reduced understanding of the
artistic practice by scientists and academic scholars in general.118 Secondly, “the time costs for
interdisciplinary collaboration are very high, as are the communication and moderation costs.”119
And thirdly, “artists have a tendency to refuse the process of the division of labor, because they
fear losing their status of artist in the art world, even though this opportunity would give them
access to a socially relevant field of action which lies beyond the distinction game of the art
market.”120
Even when, as noted by Penny, transdisciplinary collaboration and participatory practice
is natural in the sciences as well as in artistic practices such as music, dance, theater, film,
etc.,121 the collaboration between the former and the latter seem to be still inconsistent. Penny
states that these new sets of collaborative practices need to have a specialized approach in order
to be fully understood, for “this tradition can be fully understood neither within the terms of
conventional art historical discourse nor within the terms of discourses of technological research
and development.”122 They do not fall into the traditional history of art, nor do they add an equal
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input for the technological and scientific research. This little understanding of the stage and
purpose of involvement has led, according to Penny, to underestimate the potentiality of these
practices, thus letting them “fall between the cracks”123 and later be disregarded.
Probably a more suitable way to understand these projects would be to conceive of them
as knowledge ecosystems, a term borrowed from organizational management,124 for they entail
different types of relationships, goals, and interactions that vary from one project to another. As
they often imply a meta-dialogue on the very nature of the collaboration (its significance, its
meaning, and implications), they could operate as ecologies of knowledge because they rely on
“self-consciousness” in order to get “to what is behind what they actually do and how they
work.”125 In any case, the artistic projects that are developed under these schemata contest the
value system and criteria of disciplines in its conventionality.
Art and Science as Divergent Forms of Inquiry
The ideal of an equally involved, equally credited collaboration, which does not seem to
be the model that prevails in these projects, has led scholars to revisit a more ontological
difference between the arts and the sciences as ways of knowing. This constitutes a third main
perspective on the contribution of art to knowledge. These new critiques have highlighted the
lack of a common ground between the participants of this collaboration in terms of what is the
very goal of such practice. In other words, what is the purpose of the dialogue? Is it the creation
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of a new form of organized knowledge? Is it the expansion of the existing scientific/technical
knowledge? Or is it just the broadening of the aesthetic possibilities of art via the use of new
technologies?
In a rather philosophical tone, Paul Feyerabend states that scientists are similar to artists
and artisans because they both utilize unknown material, Being, to shape the world and, “just as
stone permits the construction of artworks vastly different in appearance, in the same way Being
permits the construction of different manifest worlds.”126 As we shall see, there are ontological
discrepancies between the two that need to be outlined in order to understand their convergence.
Peter Weibel, for example, suggests that if art and science are to be compared, art should be
regarded as method, and that it is there where both systems could be similar.127 He suggests,
however, that this assertion does not imply that both methods are similar in their operation but
only that both art and science are methodological.128
There is a significant difference between artistic and scientific practices, points out Amie
L. Thomasson, for science is based on a “discovery model,” whose premises rely on thinking that
there is a real world with a body of “fully determinate, mind-independent facts about which
everyone may be ignorant or in error, but (some of) which the scientist seeks to discover by
substantive empirical investigations.”129 Subsuming the arts under this model, Thomasson
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suggests, “leads us badly astray.”130 Instead, one can experience ontological knowledge in art,
not through discovery “when by investigations into the mind-independent world,” but by
following
the method of analyzing the conception embodied in the practices of those competent
speakers who ground and reground reference of the term. As a result, although competent
grounders of the term’s reference may not have an explicit ontological view stated in
formal philosophical terms, their background ontological conception of the sort of entity
they are talking about is not subject to the kinds of massive error to which everyone’s
beliefs are subject, according to the discovery model.131
Thomasson, then, makes the distinction between empirical knowledge (provided by
science), and ontological knowledge (which would be provided by art). She concludes by saying
that ontological knowledge in the arts is achieved by the personal beliefs and practices of those
who ground the use of artistic terms (painting, sculpture, novel, etc.) in their work.132
Ontological knowledge carried out by art, then, is categorically different from its empirical,
scientific counterpart.
According to this viewpoint, the question of knowledge in art, if answered positively,
should include a more critical issue on what kind of knowledge art provides and how it differs
from the scientific. In asking these questions, Sabine Flach and Bergit Arends state that “the
comparison of artistic and scientific knowledge itself presupposes a specific knowledge inherent
in art, and it also presumes that this knowledge is irreducible and characteristic for art, so that
the genuine and productive achievements of art itself are in focus.”133 They suggest that the
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debate should focus on the differences between both methods in order to use these differences
“productively,” so “this is about recognizing different ways of knowing, and about the interplay
of different perspectives and forms of cognition.”134 Sarat Maharaj, on this matter, poses the
same queries and contrasts the knowledge acquired from technological and scientific research to
that gained from the visual arts.135 He states that the visual arts propose a paradigm of thinking
through the visual,136 in which a focus on “unpacking” the discourse, “taking apart its
components,” and “scouring its operations” occurs.137 Maharaj suggests the use of the term xenoepistemics to refer to the specific knowledge production provided by these practices (visual arts
in this case), for it operates outside what it is commonly understood as knowledge and spawns
“other” kinds of knowledge that the former cannot.138
When scrutinizing the similarities and differences of science and art, scholars often
outline the kinds of impact, influences, and cross-fertilization that occur in the intersection. Shaw
recognizes that the influence of science in art is evident (in movements like Impressionism,
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Cubism, Futurism, etc.), but that it is hazardous to make the assertion vice versa,139 an
observation that is shared by Wiebel as well.140
Wilson, who clearly shares his optimism on the mutual enrichment of the collaboration
between the two agents,141 acknowledges that there are similarities as well as differences
between the work of the artist and that of the scientist. For instance, while the former “seeks
aesthetic response, emotion, and intuition, and is idiosyncratic and evocative,” the latter “seeks
knowledge and understanding, reason, normative,” and is “explanatory.”142
After these considerations and identified differences, the role of art in the pursuit of
knowledge measured against science is, then, seen as complimentary. Artists, for Wilson, “might
see aspects of the problems missed by other researchers. The arts could become a place where
abandoned, discredited, and unorthodox inquiries could be pursued.”143 For Wilson, other
contributions of the arts to the scientific enterprise also include the interpretation of results in a
different way, the moving away from functionality when designing technology, and a different
way of communicating findings that takes into account its cultural implications.144
Even those who praised the similarity between art and science also identify differences
and share the idea of the former as complimentary to the latter. For instance, Heine says that the
input of artists could be valuable to science for “they render a representation of experience
139
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whose vindication lies in its resonance with the experience of others.”145 However, beyond the
idea of art as complimentary, another epistemological function of art could be, as noted by Shaw,
to undermine the previously established rigid constraints that realms like science and technology
often entail.146
Elliot Eisner summarizes arts’ contributions to knowledge in three points. First, “the arts
address the qualitative nuances of situations,”147 which means that works of art foster habits of
perception and reading of representations. “A second contribution has to do with empathic
feeling,”148 which Eisner identifies in the expressiveness of the work of art. Finally, “a third
contribution has to do with the provision of a fresh perspective so that our old habits of mind do
not dominate our reactions with stock responses,”149 which is indicated by art’s constant
invitation to reflect and look at what is being presented in a different way.
A similar perspective is taken by James Magrini, who believes that “the cognitive content
of art is not akin to the cognitive content of the sciences,” because science “tells us what life is
by demonstrating its truth-claims, providing truth that is actual in nature;”150 conversely, art
“illuminates, reveals, and intimates truth perceptually, and within moments of insight, shows us
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what life is, and concomitantly, invites us to imagine what life might become.”151 Thus,
knowledge provided by art differs from that provided by science because “art provides authentic
insight into the complex existential aspects of life, e.g., the meaning of love, suffering, aging,
religious insight, the essential world of nature, our moral interpersonal responsibilities.”152
A final note on the possible contributions of an artistic perspective to scientific
knowledge, which has been widely disregarded until recently, is Goethe’s famous delicate
empiricism [Zarte Empirie]. Goethe is regarded as a prominent poet, playwright, and
philosopher, but he also produced a considerable body of scientific work.153 His delicate
empiricism is based on rigorous attention, as well as extended and direct observation and
experience to create a sort of empathy, intuition, and imagination between the knower and the
object.154 This method “provided an alternative and complementary epistemology to
conventional scientific practice and its underlying dualistic and rationalistic epistemology that
categorically separates the observer and the observed.”155 Goethe’s delicate empiricism,
however, does not constitute an example of knowledge achievement through art per se (if we
think about the artwork as the source of knowledge), but provides an interesting example of how

151

Ibid.

152

Ibid.

153

David Seamon, “Goethe’s Way of Science as a Phenomenology of Nature,” Janus
Head 8, no. 1 (2005), 86.
154

Daniel C. Wahl, “‘Zarte Empirie’: Goethean Science as a Way of Knowing,” Janus
Head 8, no. 1 (2005), 60.
155

Ibid., 58-59.
46

an artistic (individual) mind can contribute to science–-and especially to its method–-beyond an
individual discipline.156
These perspectives show that even though contemporary ideas on the possibilities of
knowledge in art have been shaped under the premise that the artist is conceived as akin to the
scientist (in his/her practice, inquiries, experimentations, and methods), these comparisons are
been taken cautiously, for it is also acknowledged that both practices entail different, often
opposite, premises and worldviews, and they yield different outcomes as a result of their inquiry.
As Adorno stated in his Aesthetic theory, “art completes knowledge with what is excluded from
knowledge and thereby once again impairs its character as knowledge, its univocity.”157
Scientific Knowledge and Enunciation
Most of the time, as noted by Maharaj, when we compare and contrast art and science,
“what we lump together as ‘science’ is often a congeries of quite divergent activities, disciplines
and domains, each with its own kit of objectives and logical procedures;”158 however, scientific
disciplines often depart from a set of assumptions that determine their practice. In this section, I
will consider the premises of the knowledge conveyed by science. I will start by briefly
describing the general principles of science and its social construction. As will be seen in
Chapter 3, I conceive of both art and science as rhetorical acts; therefore, understanding the
rhetoric of science is essential to understanding how science is operating in creating and
disseminating knowledge. To this end, I will focus on the public communication of science with
156
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special emphasis on the relationship between scientific knowledge and visualization as I
contemplate the possibility of the enhancement and enrichment of the former by the latter.
Finally, by the end of this chapter, I devote a small section to the specificity of knowledge about
solar eclipses and the way it is used and enunciated by astronomy and astrophysics.
Premises of Science and Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge
Despite the impact of the revolution on scientific thought that had occurred by the
beginning of the twentieth century with the rise of the general theory of relativity and quantum
mechanics, the organized body of knowledge production referred as the sciences shares specific
epistemological and methodological principles that give them coherence and make them
possible. Most disciplines that are considered scientific depart from the same main assumptions
about the world, thus providing a more or less consensual ground of what characterizes science.
These principles are numerous, and they mainly depend on the specific science in which
they are applied. However, several authors have outlined the general assumptions that
characterize most of the scientific disciplines. Robert Merton, for instance, in mid-twentieth
century, listed four norms of science: universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism.159 Universalism is characterized by the generalized claim that scientific
principles exceed particularities and ethnocentrisms.160 Merton’s second principle, communism,
indicates that “there is a common ownership of goods in the scientific knowledge”161 that
denotes science’s ideological claims of knowledge as a common and shareable good among
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humanity. The third norm, disinterestedness, is strongly related to the previous one, communism,
for it implies that the knowledge pursued by science is not considered a property of
researchers,162 even though, as he also notes, the systems of reward and recognition in modern
science present a contradiction to this claim.163 Finally, organized skepticism has to do with “the
standards in which criticism is organized, its content, its permissible boundaries, the criteria of
evidence for and against scientific rules.”164
Merton’s list deals with generalized assumptions of what we may call the ethics of
science. Nevertheless, there are other principles that rule scientific inquiry and its production of
knowledge that are worth noting in order to understand the specific interests of scientific
discourse. For instance, Everett Mendelsohn, when discussing the social production of scientific
knowledge, constantly summarizes and refers to the main assumptions of science as three:
rationalism, empiricism, and “an underlying belief in a material reality.” 165 But, beyond the
principles of objectivity and rationalism, and despite the operational procedure of the scientific
method, I would like to focus in the following, more structured tenets (or axioms) that underlie
the scientific understanding of the world and nature and which are particularly relevant to the
purpose of this analysis: determinism, mechanisms, measurement, and prediction.
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The principle of determinism prescribes that “the natural laws and the way things are at
time t determine the way things will be at later times.”166 Barry Loewer explains that in this
axiom, to say that an event is determined means that it “logically necessitates”167 from the
previous conditions and the future outcome in order to be. In this way, given a specific scientific
law, the event that it describes would be logically resulted, in a given time t, from the law. The
idea of mechanisms, in this sense, is related to determinism for it assumes that events “are
systems consisting of a collection of parts that interact with each other in order to produce some
behavior.”168 Therefore, science, through an adequate theory, “should give an account of what
mechanisms are, how they are discovered and represented, and the role that mechanisms play in
scientific explanation.”169
In order to give an account of how nature’s mechanisms work, science necessitates
measurement to assign numerical values to physical variables.170 Measurement, then, is a
symbolic assignment of values to what is observed in an event. This idea, however, as noted by
Hasok Chang and Nancy Cartwright, carries epistemological issues such as the sole idea of
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quantification reduction and the problems of precision and conventions in the choice of
numerical values.171
Prediction is an axiom that draws particular attention to the analysis with which I am
concerned in this thesis. As explained by Malcolm Forster, prediction is not reduced only to
explanation of future events, but it is the projection of the theory to the past, the present, or the
future.172 For instance, if it is true, based on the previous axioms, that a particular event is
determined by laws, that these laws describe mechanisms that rule the event, and that
measurement provides a symbolic understanding of it, then it is possible to predict the
occurrence of the event in the future, as well as in the past. Solar eclipses provide a good
example for, based on the mathematical formulae to trace them, we can predict eclipses that will
take place in the future and postdict eclipses that happened in the past.173 Prediction is “entailed
by the theory,”174 for it is “an objective relation between theory and evidence.”175
There are many other principles that could be found in almost any scientific inquiry and
knowledge claim;176 however, I would like to draw attention to two additional axioms that are
pertinent to this analysis, for they prevail in the way science enunciates knowledge about solar
eclipses, which is the specific content that the artwork to be analyzed in this text is
171
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reformulating. I treat these axioms separately from and in addition to the previous principles
described above for, as previously stated, they operate more evidently in the scientific account of
this astronomical phenomenon.
The first is the assumption that knowing a phenomenon in a scientific way requires an
understanding of the mathematics behind it. An alternative formulation of the same principle
could be: the ultimate laws of nature are mathematical. As described in their punctual
comparison between Plato’s cosmology and the Big Bang theory, Brisson and Meyerstein
explain that this axiom may be traced back to Plato’s Timaeus, where the philosopher states that
the scientific episteme of the universe can only be reached via the mathematical understanding of
it.177 In a similar vein, contemporary scientific models of celestial bodies and their movements,
according to these authors, are “reducible to some simple mathematical primordial elements, and
everything happening in the universe, every time-dependent change (kinesis), is also reducible to
simple mathematical interactions between simple mathematical elements. The result will be an
ordered world, a kosmos.”178
The implication of this axiom is that it creates an ideal (a model) of the observed universe
that does not correspond to the complexity of its perceived nature. This difference between
theory and sensible reality is referred to by the authors as a hiatus irrationalis,179 for every
scientific theory, which “can only resist falsification” but “can never be verified”180 is a symbolic
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representation (and a reduction by extension) of the complexity of the sublunary world that
“includes everything mankind is able to resolve, or analyze, into its elementary constituents.”181
The last scientific axiom I would like to describe is the one that claims an apparent lack
of meaning on observed prescribed natural laws. Hakan Snellman describes the development of
the scientific project, whose origins he identifies with Galileo, as presupposing the idea that the
data and facts explained by science have no further meaning.182 For Snellman, the scientific
account of the world is useful for its purpose, which has as its aim to gain power over nature, 183
but it fails to answer existential inquiries and questions of human transcendence for it “has too
weak connections to our existential perception of meaning and purpose in our lives.”184
The same lack of existential meaning and purpose could be said to be one of the features
that enhanced the appeal of Darwin’s theory of evolution because, as Alexander Rosenberg
points out, for the very first time, nature appeared to have a goal,185 through selectiveness, that
was deprived of, and completely opposed to, previous concepts of transcendent purpose and of
divine, immutable, design. In this sense, evolution theory does not only provide an explanation
of the development of certain species, but also changed, at an essential level, our understanding
of life’s purpose.
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Each one of these assumptions implies a specific way of understanding the world and
conveying knowledge, which ultimately exposes the particular ideology and discursive agenda
that permeates the sciences. However, in the last century, science has been scrutinized and
criticized at its very foundations. This is what philosophers of science, like Eduardo Nicol, call
its crisis of principles. Perhaps the most relevant idea that this crisis yielded, and which today is
widely recognized also by scientists and science practitioners,186 is that scientific knowledge is
socially constructed; in other words, the weight that cultural, political, and social biases have in
shaping any scientific inquiry is acknowledged.
Mendelsohn clarifies the basic assumption of this thesis by saying that “science is an
activity of human beings acting and interacting, thus a social activity. Its knowledge, its
statements, its techniques have been created by human beings and developed, nurtured, and
shared among groups of human beings. Scientific knowledge is therefore fundamentally social
knowledge.”187
Important contributions to this sociological account of knowledge production are seen
also in the vindication of the historical context in which scientific claims are produced. For
instance, Thomas Kuhn, in his seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, takes the
example of the Copernican revolution to highlight, first, that it did not mean only a different
understanding of the earth’s movement, but that it changed completely the meaning of both ideas

186

Mikael Stenmark, “From Modern to Postmodern Conceptions of Knowledge - Where
Do We Stand Today?” in How Do We Know?: Understanding in Science and Theology, ed. Dirk
Evers, Antje Jackelén, and T. A. Smedes (London: T & T Clark, 2010), 29-30.
187

Mendelsohn, “The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge,” 4.
54

of earth and motion;188 however, Kuhn also stressed that this revolution was possible because of
contextual factors such as a generalized social pressure for calendar reforms, the medieval
criticism to Aristotle, and the rise of Neo-Platonism,189 thus situating Copernicus’s findings
within a broader sociocultural surface in which they were plausible and necessary.
Equally important to this analysis are the critiques that consider the scientific enterprise
as necessarily discursive and, therefore, as neither ahistorical nor devoid of ideological interests.
Toward the end of his Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault devotes a section to the constitution
of institutionalized science and the ideology of knowledge. Here, he states that “once constituted,
a science does not take up everything that formed the discursive practice in which it appeared;
nor does it dissipate the knowledge that surrounds it. Knowledge is not an epistemological site
that disappears in the science that supersedes it. Science is localized in a field of knowledge and
plays a role in it.”190 With this, Foucault recognized the input of science qua discursive
organization that shapes what it is understood as knowledge. Scientific knowledge is, then, for
Foucault, the constellation of elements “formed in a regular manner by a discursive practice.”191
This consideration of science, which is also shared by authors like Hans-Georg Gadamer
and Marcia Westkott, could be characterized as constructivist for it “adds a new focus on a
discourse which sets out the prior background conditions necessary before a statement can even
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be considered.”192 Given this, the scientific claim can no longer be understood outside the
historical, cultural, and social context in which it is pronounced, or without the machinery of
enunciation that makes it possible as a rhetorical act.
Finally, it is worth noting that these critical views on science (scientific knowledge as
socially constructed and science as discursive act) are evenly shared between both realms of
science and art. For example, as I cited in the previous section, Werret insists that the
determination of a practice as artistic, scientific, or experimental is merely conventional and
results from a process of social negotiation.193 He gives the example of the development of the
telescope in the early seventeenth century, which, according to him, “moved constantly between
spheres of playful art, science, and invention.”194 A similar feeling is perceived in Brisson and
Meyerstein’s comparison between Plato’s Timaeus and the Big Bang narrative, which they
identify akin in nature and assumptions but, one would argue, the former being considered as
philosophical and the latter as scientific.
Rhetoric of Science and Scientific Visualization
As noted by Paul Teller, scientific claims are given, primarily, as linguistic because they
need the description of theories and laws in a textual way.195 This makes evident the idea that,
above all, science needs to be communicated, that is, enunciated. This feature of science is
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characterized by its assumption of commonality, which is the “the positive imperative to
scientists that they should make their results public, or, more realistically, available to other
scientists.”196
Indeed, similar to other academic enterprises, science needs a machinery of specialized
publications, papers, presentations, and other academic formats of enunciation that constitutes
the primordial body of knowledge claims and discoveries.197 However, scientific knowledge also
necessitates the dimension of public address and other forms of enunciation that contribute
equally to the social construction of its episteme.
If the main output of science, as Georg Frank states, is information,198 then its
communication and the public understanding of science are also central to the scientific
discourse. In recent scholarship, one of the main actors in materializing scientific knowledge into
a specific rhetorical enunciation, even prior to mass media, is identified in the process of
visualization. This special emphasis in visuality and graphic representation is part of a broader
recognition that science is not always conveyed verbally. On this matter, Jay Lemke states that
“science is not done, is not communicated, through verbal language alone. It cannot be. The
‘concepts’ of science are not solely verbal concepts, thought they have verbal components. They
are semiotic hybrids, simultaneously and essentially verbal, mathematical, visual-graphical, and
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actional-operational.”199 The particular strategy of visual-graphical communication is relevant to
this analysis, for I will focus on a piece of visual art that, to an extent, relates to models of visual
representation in science.
In the context of science, visualization is often understood as the visual rendering of
scientific claims and discoveries, thus an illustration. In this regard, a recent publication by
Frankel and DePace200 provides a detailed guide for scientists and engineers to create effective
visual representations of data and scientific discoveries.201 The reason behind the utilization of
visuals when conveying information is supported by the idea that it facilitates understanding.202
According to this perspective, visuality shows logical, extra-linguistic connections that would be
meaningless through verbal communication alone.203
An interesting example is provided by a recent article by Sophie Nicholson-Cole where
she explores the communication of the implications of climate change, where the claim is that,
through visual strategies, the matter could be framed and transformed from scientific, general,
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and abstract to concrete, personal, and local.204 Her study proved that “people’s perceptions and
attitudes toward climate change are related to their visual imagery about the issue; strongly
influenced by input from various visual media as well as personal experience.”205
These perspectives imply the conception that visualization complements scientific
inquiry and enables understanding. It is worth nothing, however, that some authors have also
outlined the limitations and issues arising with visualization such as the general tendency of
representations to focus on ideals, the impossibility to represent error and uncertainty, the
dichotomy of global/local visualization, etc.206
The role of art in this relation has been subsumed to the idea of visualization as a helper.
In her analysis of the Exploratorium, which has been cited earlier, Hein expresses that the work
made by artists has served sometimes as complementary to the scientific demonstrations been
exhibited, thus facilitating visitors’ understanding of science.207 In this case, Hein is talking
about artworks that operate as illustrations of scientific theories and principles that enhance
visitors’ ability to grasp their complexity. Conventionally, and historically,208 art inserted in the
realm of science has been perceived this way.
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Visualization in science, nevertheless, is sometimes regarded also as more than the mere
visual representation of scientific knowledge.209 For instance, DeFanti, Brown and McCormick,
when describing research opportunities of visualization for science and engineering, state that
scientific visualization is both a tool for communication as well as for discovery and
understanding, for there are scientific inquiries that are impossible to comprehend if they are not
presented in visual forms,210 and they focus especially on data sets that, through computer
programs, are always rendered as graphics.
Even though scholars are posing these ideas just recently, the discursive input of visuality
in knowledge could be seen in almost any other historical enunciation of science. In an article by
Nancy Tuana, where she describes the masculine bias of biology as a tool to support and justify a
supposedly female inferiority given by natural determinism, she explores historical postures on
the matter that range from Aristotle to nineteenth-century biology. Many of the historical
biological claims cited by Tuana are accompanied by illustrations that reinforce this masculine
bias. For example, she describes the generalized idea (roughed out since Aristotle) that the male
is the one who carries the essence of life, and that the female merely provides the matter to
create the human being.211 A late seventeenth-century scientific drawing, by Nicolaus
Hartsoeker,212 illustrates the appearance of a fetus contained within the head of a spermatozoon,
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thus consolidating animalculism.213 However, as noted by Tuana, “Hartsoeker did not claim to
have seen such a being, but insisted that if we could see through the skin which hides it, we
might see it as he represent it in the illustration.”214 In this case, the illustration served as a
theoretical tool to know visually what, for any reason, had not been yet observed empirically but
was claimed as a fact.
Some authors, like Przemyslaw Prusinkiewicz, would claim even more agency to
visualization in the configuration of scientific knowledge. Prusinkiewicz upholds that if, for the
natural sciences, the main objective is the creation of models,215 and that models need abstraction
in order to be comprehensible, then the use of computer graphics visualizations would help to
achieve it, and that “in this domain both precise botanical data and artistic observation play an
important role.”216
Besides computerized graphic-rendering, scientific visualization qua illustration may also
be seen as artistic interpretation, but even in visual practices like photography, where the premise
is, normally, the unbiased capture of reality, the input of visuality in adding to the enunciation of
knowledge is recognized. For example, photographer and scientist researcher at MIT, Felice
Frankel, has stated that she uses photography in science in order to “locate the innate beauty of
the research, and to capture it with the kind of technical accuracy that can add information and
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generate new ways of thinking;” 217 thus, suggesting a rather more discursive and epistemic input
to science through visualization.
Scientific visualization, not in the way of Hartsoeker’s spermatozoon illustration, may be
also a way to materialize concepts and phenomena that, otherwise, could not be reached by
regular human observation. In this line, Luc Pauwels explains that when the referent of a
representation is more “immaterial and abstract in nature,” such as black holes or hypothetical
events, visualization plays an important role on shaping our perspectives over that referent.218 In
this case, visualization is crucial as it might be the only way to know something that is not
observable, exceeds our human visual capacities219 or, simply, has not happened yet. But, beyond
that, this also suggests that visualization acts in the formation of an image, a mental construction,
of concepts and other phenomena.
In the introduction to his famous book A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking cites an
episode in which a scientist is contested by a non-scientist person regarding the form of the
universe: “Most people nowadays would find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of
turtles rather ridiculous. But why should we think we know better?”220 Hawking makes use of
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this extravagant idea in order to state the point that the scientific account of the universe also
provides a mental image of it, and that this image has changed throughout time.221
As I expressed in the introduction when discussing the issue of observation in both
science and art, I drew attention to astronomy as primordially a visual enterprise. In this area of
inquiry, given the dimensions of what is being studied, the enunciation of knowledge through
visuality serves both to convey information about the world, the universe and the cosmos, and to
configure a mental image of it. An interesting example of this was given recently when NASA’s
exploration spacecraft, Voyager 2, demonstrated that the shape of the solar system is not
spherical, but dented.222
The contemporary image that we picture on our mind when thinking about the space and
our solar system is primarily given by science and, I think, is an important dimension of our
understanding of phenomena like solar eclipses. In the final section of this chapter, I will focus
on the specificity of the scientific account of solar eclipses derived from astronomy and
astrophysics.
Solar Eclipses
35. The eclipse as cosmically irrelevant, as a subjective experience, as an optical illusion.
36. A Shadow.
~Pablo Vargas Lugo, Sun (brochure to Eclipses for Austin)
The comparison between art and science as two large, unified, and solid blocks of
cultural production could lead us astray for, as Weibel suggests, if we are to do so we need to be
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concrete on what art and which type of science are we coupling.223 He punctually asks, “when we
speak of the convergence of art and science do we mean that of mathematics and music or
physics and painting or biology and sculpture or linguistics and architecture?”224 The distinction
is critical because, as he notes, the level of cross-influence and convergence is much clearer in
specific sciences and specific types of art—for instance, the influence of drawing in biology and
cartography, the convergence of linguistics and philosophy in late 1960s and early 1970s
conceptual art, etc.225
In this case, the two factors in the comparison are identified as the visual arts in one hand,
and astronomy on the other. So, the question arises: What do we know, specifically, about solar
eclipses? Probably more important would be probably to ask how do we know what we know
about them? The contemporary idea of partial and total solar eclipses exists somewhere between
science, mysticism, religion, and subjectivity. Eclipses are the type of events that are
characterized as being highly ambiguous: astrophysicists can trace with fathomless accuracy, and
with the use of relatively simple mathematical geometrical formulae, the exact trajectory of any
foreseeable eclipse; and, at the same time, the idea of the darkened sun and the daylight turned
into nocturnal dark still shocks and thrills individuals, even when they (we) know what the
phenomenon is all about.
In general, it could be said that there is almost no contemporary scholarship or
specialized scientific research dedicated to investigating the nature of solar eclipses or, in other
words, their causes and mechanisms. This is because it is commonly agreed that the phenomenon
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is fully understood: Via a process of syzygy226 (alignment of three celestial bodies within a solar
system), an astronomical occultation occurs in which the moon transits between the earth and the
sun. Usually, scientists and educators regard this phenomenon, an event that “it is not visible
from most planets,”227 as a big coincidence: “It happens that our sun is 400 times larger than our
moon but, on average, nearly 400 times farther away, so the sun and moon have nearly equal
angular diameters of about 0.5°.”228 During a solar eclipse, the transit of the moon creates a
shadow that consists of two parts: the penumbra and the umbra.229 The penumbra is the moon's
faint outer shadow in which partial solar eclipses could be seen. The umbra is the moon's dark
inner shadow, in which total solar eclipses are experienced.230
There are four types of eclipses: partial, annular, total, and hybrid.231 In the partial
eclipse, the umbral shadow misses earth and only the penumbral traverses it. The annular eclipse
occurs when the moon is too far from earth to completely cover the sun, thus a bright ring is
visible around the moon. The total eclipse is experienced when the observer is placed in the
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transit of the moon’s umbra and the moon seems to cover entirely the sun. Finally, hybrid
eclipses occur when eclipses appear both annular and total in different sections of its path.232
A solar eclipse can only occur at new moon, which occurs every 29.5 days; however,
eclipses do not occur every month (as could be thought) because the moon's orbit is tilted about 5
degrees to Earth's orbit around the Sun.233 Normally, the moon passes over or under the sun
(from the earth perspective). Eclipses occur only when both bodies, sun and moon, are aligned
near one of the crossing points of the moon’s orbit, also called nodes.234 Geometrically, there are
two nodes in the sky where the moon passes and solar eclipses are possible, which gives the
following mathematical range of occurrence of solar eclipses:
The sun does not have to be exactly on the node when the moon arrives there, only close
enough for the moon to block some portion of the sun. This leaves a "window" of about
18.75 days before and after the sun gets to the nodes. During this 37.5-day period, the
moon can cause an eclipse. Since the moon takes 29.5 days to go from new moon to new
moon, this means that an eclipse of some kind is guaranteed about every six months.235
On average, a specific location on earth experiences a solar eclipse every 375 years;236
however, this rate varies based on latitude. There are places, like Papua New Guinea, that
experienced two total solar eclipses in less than 18 months between 1983 and 1984.237 Solar
eclipses vary, not only in type (partial, total, annular, or hybrid), but also in duration. The moon’s
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umbra, which is never bigger than 168 miles (270 km) in diameter, sweeps the earth surface at
1000 mph (1600 km/hr); thus, the sun cannot be totally eclipsed for more than 7.5 minutes.238
The explanation of the phenomenon, here briefly summarized, complies with one of the
scientific axioms outlined in the previous section, which states that knowledge of a specific
phenomenon is knowledge of its mathematical mechanisms and that, ultimately, any event,
concept, or phenomena could be reduced to numbers. It seems clear that, in terms of scientific
concern, solar eclipses are both a coincidence and also events that could be easily traced through
mathematical geometrical formulae.
In the previous chapter, I also stressed a scientific axiom that prevails in the general
attitude of science towards nature, which assumes that knowledge lies in nature deprived of
meaning. Do scientific accounts of solar eclipses circumvent any meaning or symbolic
association? Not entirely. However, acknowledgment of meaning is often considered extrascientific. For example, in science, recognition of ancient perspectives about this phenomenon is
usually done either in order to mark a difference between those perspectives and the perspective
of the contemporary scientific enterprise or to acknowledge in their practices previous attempts
at scientific observation.239
For example, the Goddard Space Flight Center’s educational website on solar and moon
eclipses dedicates a section to eclipse interpretation in different traditions and cultures. In this
section, the distinction between them (ancient traditions) and us (technoscientific society) seems
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clear, with notable omission of contemporary popular interpretations that, even when they are
not mythical or religious, are still present. After describing those cultures and traditions as
having a more personal relationship with nature, the website states: “While science has brought
us many obvious advances, giving us the power to predict and describe nature in great detail, it
seems that we have lost that sense of intimacy and personal connection, the cosmic embrace that
our ancestors experienced so strongly,”240 thus suggesting that a scientific mind requires a
systematic deprivation of meaning, interpretation, intuition, intimacy, or personal connection to
the natural phenomena that it attempts to understand.
Knowledge of total and partial solar eclipses is often provided in big lists that contain
past and future eclipses.241 Apparently, eclipse tracing requires simple mathematical knowledge,
and there is nothing more that scientists can state regarding this event; however, if this natural
phenomenon is commonly understood, what, then, is knowledge of solar eclipses useful for?
In the first place, eclipse mapping methods vary and are often improved and critiqued
between researchers—for example, Keith Horne’s proposed method, developed in1985,242 which
was later improved by Baptista and Steiner in 1993.243 Secondly, solar eclipses are frequently
used to observe secondary phenomena that concern scientists, like the solar corona or gravity
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variations in earth.244 Notable discoveries during solar eclipses include the detection of the
element Helium (He) during a solar eclipse in 1868 when observing the outer atmosphere of the
sun,245 and the famous confirmation246 of Einstein’s relativity theory in 1919, when British
photographers captured the bend of the light due to the sun’s gravitational field.247
Scientist Jay M. Pasachoff conceives of solar eclipses as astrophysical laboratories in
which “observations reaches spatial, temporal and spectral-resolution domains that are
inaccessible from space and therefore complement satellite studies.”248 Study of the solar corona
is regarded as the major astronomical observation during solar eclipses,249 a study that includes
coronal temperature and density variations and fine-scale coronal dynamics.
It is clear that, beyond the understanding of the mechanisms behind eclipses, for the
scientific community, these events could serve a functional purpose, a tool, a natural laboratory
both in earth as well as in space: “Solar eclipses observed from spacecraft can be useful for
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calibrating the scattered light and intensities in the spacecraft, as well as using the advancing
edge of the moon to measure the resolution of the spacecraft.”250
Solar eclipses then, from the scientific perspective, have been seen as a spectacular
coincidence in which moon and sun seem to have the same diameter as observed from earth. The
event is highly predictable and reducible to various mathematical geometrical formulae, and its
contemplation, deprived and distanced from any meaning and interpretation, is mainly used to
observe and measure several other phenomena that are either enabled or facilitated during the
lapse of a solar eclipse.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have attempted to construct a solid conceptual framework to analyze
Vargas Lugo’s work, Eclipses for Austin, as an artifact that reformulates and expands on
scientific knowledge of solar eclipses. First, I discussed classical philosophical perspectives on
the matter of knowledge through art. I focused on Plato’s idea of art as a defective imitation of
nature; Aristotle’s belief that moral learning, catharsis, as the main outcome of drama; Kant’s
concern with the aesthetic experience as the ultimate goal of art, thus devoid of cognition; and,
finally, Hegel’s categories of types of relations between form and idea that vary historically.
As modern and contemporary art moved away from figuration and implied a new
conception of the role of the artist, as well as new sets of collaboration between it and other
disciplines, the possibility of knowledge through art is also reformulated. In the second section of
this chapter, I focused, then, on this new perspective over the issue of art and cognition. James O.
Young’s revision of representation provides a new dimension for understanding how mimêsis
acts in gaining knowledge of specific cases and objects through art. Later, I detailed three main
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perspectives on contemporary art and knowledge: 1) the more or less generalized idea that both
art and science have methodological and practical similarities, thus equaling the artistic practice
to that of the scientist; 2) the new roles that artists play in society, often resulting in artists
working in research environments and on collaborative projects; and, finally, 3) the focus on the
differences between art and science instead of on their similarities regarding inquiries and
knowledge production. By the end of that section I listed specific inputs that art can provide to
science, which include a focus on specificities rather than generalities, expressiveness, and
meaning as well as critical attitudes to undermine and question scientific legitimacy and unity.
In order to understand the relationship between art and science, I then described the main
premises of science and the social construction of scientific knowledge, primarily through visual
communication. I stressed particular axioms (assumptions) that are relevant to my thesis, such as
the assumption that natural phenomena can be understood mathematically, the lack of meaning
in natural events, and the ideas of prediction, measurement, and determination among others.
Finally, by the end of the chapter, I stressed the importance of focusing on the specific
knowledge that is produced from astronomy and astrophysics with regard to solar eclipses. I
noted that the scientific account often depicts eclipses as coincidental events, and that interest in
solar eclipses usually entails experiments and research on other natural phenomena (solar corona,
earth gravitation, relativity, and the like).
The following chapter is devoted to describing the methodology that I will follow in my
analysis of Eclipses for Austin. I will describe how I conceive of both scientific and artistic
practices as rhetorical acts, and I will describe the research questions that I will try to answer
after the analysis. A more detailed description of the artwork is also given in the following
chapter.
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CHAPTER 3:
METHOD
In this thesis, I will analyze Eclipses for Austin, an art installation by Pablo Vargas Lugo,
and its relationship to scientific knowledge and enunciation. I conceive of the work of art as a
rhetorical artifact that is a response to a specific situation, thus generating rhetorical discourses to
address that situation that can be described and analyzed. Contemporary art has been, far from
the focus on form and mastery of a medium, a tool that artists use for communication,
enunciation, and materialization of specific ideas—be they related to the social apparatus,
individual transcendence, philosophical perspectives, etc. Art is a statement. Art conceived of as
a discursive artifact requires rhetorical approaches in order to understand its operation within a
specific discursive frame.
As stated in previous chapters, I will analyze the rhetorical discourses that emerge from
Vargas Lugo’s work as a response to expand on scientific knowledge and enunciation; in order
to achieve this, I will perform a rhetorical analysis of the piece. This chapter is, therefore,
devoted to my research questions as well as to the methodological framework to be used. I depart
from the assumption that the artist is consciously and expressly using knowledge of solar
eclipses obtained from scientific enunciation as a theme in his artwork, thus, I will focus on the
visual and discursive elements that he utilizes to create bridges or connections between the
scientific and the artistic. To this end, I will primarily use the idea of the rhetorical situation as
proposed by critic Lloyd F. Bitzer as my theoretical and methodological framework. For the data
itself, I will rely on Eclipses for Austin as well as on personal interviews I conducted with both
the artist himself and curator Úrsula Dávila-Villa. In the following sections I will proceed to
describe Bitzer’s rhetorical situation as well as detailing the elements of the artifact.
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Research Questions
To understand Vargas Lugo’s Eclipses for Austin as a contemporary art piece that draws
from and contributes to our understanding of scientific knowledge, I pose the following research
questions: What are contemporary artistic practices generating when they rearticulate scientific
means of knowledge production and enunciation? What rhetorical discourses emerge from these
practices as a response to expand on scientific knowledge?
I depart from the idea that both art and science require a specific enunciation in which
their specific discourses are embedded. In classical rhetoric, enunciation is often regarded as the
speech utterance that combines pronunciation and articulation.251 In this case, however, scientific
and artistic enunciations are understood in terms of how their discourses are coming into being as
rhetorical acts, in other words, when they are communicated. Therefore, my research questions
are focused on exploring the actual communication (articulation and utterance) of scientific
knowledge that is carried out by the artwork.
Rhetorical Situation
Given that I am not an art historian myself, I will treat the production of a work of art as a
rhetorical act. I am aware that art (and especially contemporary art) could be approached from
different and even oppositional methodological frameworks, such as semiotics, formalism, style,
historicity, and visual culture, to name a few. Rhetorical theory, on the other hand, is historically
attached to speech and language. However, contemporary rhetorical criticism often allows a
broader spectrum of artifacts to be analyzed. In many cases, productions from visual culture and
works of art constitute these artifacts. In this sense, I consider it appropriate to treat works of art
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as discursive artifacts that, when examined, reveal critical attitudes and issues posed by the
artists that create them. Citing critic Kenneth Burke, I agree that “when an art object engages our
attention, by the sheer nature of the case we are involved in at least as much of a communicative
relationship as prevails between a pitchman and a prospective consumer.”252
I would like to stress, however, that visual works conceived as rhetorical artifacts should
not be reduced to their formal elements as being the particles of the discourse, i.e. motifs, colors,
figures, metaphors, etc. I think that contemporary art requires a broader understanding of
rhetorical elements based on the complexity of the artworks. In many cases, contemporary works
of art include gestures, performances, and actions that cannot be reduced to visuality but that
function as entangled statements or attitudes, even when the result is indeed rendered as a visual
image or artwork. For example, the image of the green fluorescent bunny,253 unquestionably the
flag of bio-art, embeds far more discourses than just the fact that the animal glows due to the
effect of the green fluorescent protein (GFP). This is why I utilize Lloyd F. Bitzer’s concept of
the rhetorical situation as a way to understand how contemporary art is operating, since it allows
us to reach deeper, often abstract (non-visible) levels of discourse layered within contemporary
art pieces.
According to Bitzer, meaning emerges from a given situation, and “no utterance is fully
intelligible unless meaning-context and utterance are understood.”254 This means that a rhetorical
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artifact needs to be understood in relationship to the factors that contribute to its production. The
rhetorical situation, for Bitzer, is not merely the understanding of the setting in which a discourse
takes place (the physical space, context, the audience, etc.),255 nor is it reduced to the persuasive
situation;256 rather, the situation is the circumstance by which an artifact comes to being. For
Bitzer, rhetorical works (i.e., artifacts) emerge as a response to a very specific situation.
A tree does not obtain its character-as-tree from the soil, but rhetorical discourse, I shall
argue, does obtain its character-as-rhetorical from the situation which generates it.
Rhetorical works belong to the class of things which obtain their character from the
circumstances of the historic context in which they occur. A rhetorical work is analogous
to a moral action rather than to a tree. An act is moral because it is an act performed in a
situation of a certain kind; similarly, a work is rhetorical because it is a response to a
situation of a certain kind.257
To better understand Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, we must think of rhetorical works as
pragmatic, that is, they exist for the sake of performing some specific task.258 The need for
which the rhetorical act responds is called the exigence. The exigence, as explained by Bitzer, is
“an imperfection marked by urgency; it is a defect, an obstacle, something waiting to be done, a
thing which is other than it should be.”259 Hence, the rhetorical exigence is the necessity that the
rhetorical work is addressing. The first step in my analysis of Vargas Lugo’s piece will be, then,
to identify the exigence to which he is responding through his artwork.
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As Foss and Foss point out, Bitzer’s rhetorical situation comprises three additional
elements: the constraints, the audience, and the fitting response.260 For this analysis, I am
particularly interested in rhetorical constraints, which are constituted by those elements (persons,
events, objects) that have the power to change the exigence,261 as well as the fitting response.
The constraints in the rhetorical situation are opportunities and limitations that the rhetor
confronts and manages with the rhetorical work to respond to the exigence and provoke
change.262 The second stage of my analysis will be devoted to identify and describe these
constraints from which the artwork is coming to exist.
Bitzer specifies that there are two types of constraints, those originated and managed by
the rhetor and those that are operative and do not depend on the former.263 For him, “beliefs,
attitudes, documents, facts, traditions, images, interests, motives and the like”264 characterize
typical forms of operative constraints.
The next step in my analysis, which will constitute the majority of my discussion in this
thesis, will be to describe the discourses that emerge from the artwork and that address the
exigence that has arisen as a result of the operative constraints. These discourses constitute what
Bitzer identifies as the fitting response. For him, “discourse is rhetorical insofar as it functions
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(or seeks to function) as a fitting response to a situation which needs and invites it.”265 When a
rhetorical situation has been established, the rhetorical work (the artifact), as I have explained,
works as the response to this situation, the fitting response. Bitzer explains that, “although
rhetorical situation invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response. Thus the
second characteristic of rhetorical situation is that it invites a fitting response, a response that fits
the situation.”266 This response, as I had stated, is what will constitute the centrality of my thesis
and the majority of my findings.
Since its formulation in 1968, Bitzer’s concept of the rhetorical situation has been widely
accepted, as well as contested and questioned. Barbara A. Biesecker, for instance, critiqued the
idea that the rhetorical situation apparently implies that the audience is constituted by
consummate individuals, thus limiting the discourse’s persuasive capabilities.267 Notable is also
Richard E. Vatz’s article “The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” where he points out Bitzer’s
Platonist Weltanschauung268 in which he considers, rhetors, objects, and relations to be objective
and present in reality, prior to the rhetorical event.269 Despite the criticisms and elaborations of
Bitzer’s model, it still can be used as a general scheme to approach and analyze an artifact
because it offers an understanding of the actors and discourses involved in a rhetorical act. This
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is the way I am utilizing rhetorical situation to understand the meaning that emerges from Vargas
Lugo’s piece.
As I stated previously, Eclipses for Austin expressly introduces scientific knowledge in
the discursive content of the artwork, literally citing a specific system of organized knowledge
(i.e., science). Why is the artist doing this and what is his purpose? In order to answer this
question that, ultimately, will help me answer my research questions, an understanding of a work
of art through its rhetorical elements is necessary. It is indispensable to identify the exigence that
the artist is fulfilling as well as the set of relationships he is creating between the artistic and the
scientific, the objective knowledge and the mystic personal experience, the general and the
particular, etc. In summary, my methodology will be focused on the following three levels of
analysis: a) I will identify and describe the exigence to which the artwork is a response; b) I will
identify and describe the operative constraints from which the artwork is coming into being as a
rhetorical artifact; and, finally, c) I will identify and describe the discourses that emerge from the
work that address the exigence and that constitute the fitting response to the rhetorical situation.
Approaching Contemporary Art through Rhetorical Criticism
Contemporary art, as I stated in Chapter 2, is not so different from a verbal statement;
hence, it could be conceived of as a rhetorical act. Although for the purpose of this analysis I will
not focus on audience response, it is departing from this specific concept that Bitzer elaborates
his conception of science and art and their (im)possibility to be rhetorical. The audience, for him,
is the group of individuals able to be changed by the rhetorical work.270 However, when
elaborating on this concept, Bitzer comments that “neither scientific nor poetic discourse
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requires an audience in the same sense”271 as a rhetorical discourse does. He argues that,
although both discourses have an audience in the strict sense, the scientist “can produce a
discourse expressive or generative of knowledge without engaging another mind,”272 whereas
“the poet's creative purpose is accomplished when the work is composed.”273 It is clear that for
Bitzer, the discursive production of both science and art can exist alone, without a rhetorical
enunciation and without requiring a rhetorical audience. For him, conversely to the scientific and
poetic audiences, the rhetorical audience “must be capable of serving as mediator of the change
which the discourse functions to produce.”274 Later in my analysis I will expand on this idea and
argue that both science and art are rhetorical practices because they require an enunciation in
order to be communicated as well as an audience that changes (gains knowledge or has an
aesthetic response) after experiencing it.
In order to scrutinize this idea of the rhetorical audience, I found Richard L. Larson’s
comment on Bitzer’s rhetorical situation very helpful. Larson points out an apparently
problematic issue that the rhetorical situation suggests regarding the division of actions into
rhetorical and non-rhetorical categories.275 Larson suggests that, for Bitzer, an action is rhetorical
for it is a response to a specific situation, and that the designation of rhetorical should be
reserved exclusively for discourse generated in circumstances that have the characteristics stated
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by Bitzer (exigence, audience, constraints and fitting response).276 These requirements
immediately yield a set of categories regarding the rhetorical and the non-rhetorical. Larson
suggests, then, that it could be possible to think of a third category constituted by discourse that
“was thought to be rhetorical when produced, but is not truly so because (as events turn out) it
could not have modified the exigence.”277 Using the same logic, one could think that a new
(fourth?) category could be constituted by such discourses that might have not been produced as
rhetorical per se, at least not expressly, but that when enunciated, address the exigence and
provide a fitting response. As I will later explain in further chapters, this issue arises from the
idea that a rhetorical act is so because it is intended in this way since its conception. Even
though, as discussed previously, Bitzer did not think of the poetic discourse as necessarily
rhetorical, the personal intention of the artist as rhetor plays an important role in the artistic
discourse.
Contemporary rhetorical criticism offers a broader possibility to analyze different
discursive acts through a rhetorical methodology. Sonja Foss, for instance, stresses the
importance of studying the visual as part of the rhetorical environment: “Visual artifacts
constitute a major part of the rhetorical environment, and to ignore them to focus only on verbal
discourse means we understand only a miniscule portion of the symbols that affect us daily.”278
Although, as I have argued, contemporary art cannot be reduced solely to visuality,
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understanding the visual as rhetorical is crucial to approaching art rhetorically since it is usually
rendered in visual forms.
Even when a specific artwork’s purpose is not figurative representation, it still requires
spectatorship of some kind. In this sense, the art piece is a window or a portal through which the
viewer enters into the artist’s perspective of the world.279 This event, which is nothing else but
the aesthetic experience, is highly rhetorical for, as Marguerite Helmers explains, “viewing is a
transaction enacted within a cultural moment.”280 Thus, this experience generates a rhetorical
situation in which, according to Foss and Radich’s model to understand aesthetic response, first a
special reality is created by the art object, secondly, the audience visualizes this special reality
and, finally, there “is an identification between artist and viewer that enables the visualization to
occur.”281
Rhetorical criticism applied to contemporary art, as opposed to an art historical approach,
offers an analysis that departs from the non-specialized viewer’s experience. Helmers explains
that this perspective offers an analysis that is more akin to a postmodern conception of reality,
because it focuses on the affects and the experience at the moment of enunciation,282 thus
circumventing the necessity of art history to link the artistic production to an artistic movement,
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trend, or period specifically. In this sense, rhetorical criticism would focus neither on the
aesthetic experience with the artwork nor its aura,283 but its enunciation as a discursive artifact
(performatic or mechanically reproduced).
Finally, as Helmers explains, the artist is the decision maker when producing the work of
art;284 therefore, he or she fits the idea of the rhetor. In this regard, Scott Consigny, when
discussing Bitzer’s rhetorical situation, explains that the concept of rhetor in Bitzer’s rhetoric
might be ambiguous for it “does not possess a special capacity which distinguishes him from
other problem-solving experts.”285 An artist, then, given a specific rhetorical situation, could be
Bitzer’s rhetor, because “if the rhetor is to function effectively in novel rhetorical situations,
disclosing relevant issues in each, he requires a capacity which allows him to be receptive and
responsive to the particularities of novel contexts.”286 In my analysis, I will identify Vargas Lugo
as this rhetor who addresses the exigence in novel and creative ways.
The Artifact (Data)
As described in the introduction, Eclipses for Austin contains several elements that enrich
and enable a broader analysis of it as a work of art. In brief, the work consists of a card-stunt
performance287 at UT's Darrel K. Royal Texas Memorial Stadium, a performance (Figure 1 and
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2) that was videotaped and displayed at the Blanton Museum’s gallery on four television screens
(Figure 4). The performance was accompanied by a news-like stand containing the brochure,
Sun, which resembles a periodical publication.
The reenactment of the sun being eclipsed is the first meaningful rhetorical element. The
artist chose to recreate the eclipsing sun using a collective/massive visual production (card
stunts, which are mainly used in sports and patriotic events). However, the artwork is not the
performances of the solar eclipses themselves, for they were not meant to be displayed as
performative events in front of an audience; rather, the artist decided to create four different
videos of these events, which would be displayed later in the gallery. This gesture constitutes a
second element of analysis, for it indicates the artist’s interest to produce a testimony to these
events, rather than a mere reproduction of them.
In these videos, Vargas Lugo worked with percussionist Eric Peterson to create a
soundtrack for each solar eclipse representation. I will not focus on the formal elements of the
musical composition, but rather on the act of adding temporality to each event as a rhetorical
element that serves a specific purpose. The time feature of eclipses is highlighted by the music
for it shows how every eclipse has a particular duration, thus contrasting with the scientific idea
of describing eclipses in a general way, focusing on the main causes and the general features of
the phenomenon, and not on particularities.
In the gallery, the work was displayed on four television screens, each presenting one of
the representations. The display was accompanied by a stand with the Sun brochure, containing
several elements that communicate the idea of the work to the general public (Figure 3 and 5).
Beyond the display (which I will also count as an element of importance in the enunciation of the
work), I will also treat the content of the Sun brochure as meaningful data for my analysis. This
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brochure, resembling the layout of a newspaper or periodical publication, contains the following
elements:
• A chart indicating the solar eclipses that will be visible from the Austin area in Texas
between years 2010 and 3000.
• Two artistic illustrations of shadows covering a map representing the Texan territory
and the UT’s stadium.
• Visual representations of the four eclipses reenacted in the work, viz. April 8, 2024;
April 14, 2200; July 17, 2205; and February 25, 2343.
• Text by curator Úrsula Dávila-Villa.
• Several pictures of the performance.
• Testimonial text, followed by a series of photographs, by a participant of the
performance.
• An interview with Pablo Vargas Lugo.
These elements constitute the main data to be analyzed in this thesis. However, I will also
rely on other data that I acquired regarding the piece, viz. the artist’s official statement, the
original project description, the Museum’s press release, the gallery label for the work, a flyer for
the project, the seating chart for the performance, and other unofficial documents provided by the
artist and the curator. Finally, I will also use personal interviews that I conducted with both the
artist and the curator Úrsula Dávila-Villa as part of my data.
Interviews
Curator Úrsula Dávila-Villa introduced me to the artist, Pablo Vargas Lugo in Mexico
City during the summer of 2012. After I met with Vargas Lugo, I had a better understanding of
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his specific concerns and inquiries as an artist as well as a deeper grasp of his overall ideas in
Eclipses for Austin.
In a way, artists are akin to academic scholars and researchers for they have specialized
themes and topics of concern to them and in which they base their practice. In the case of Pablo
Vargas Lugo, eclipses, astronomy, time, and collectiveness are recurrent themes or motifs, which
he has included in several pieces, such as Reloj (2003), Moon Impression (2005), Ciclo lunar
(2006), Bonampak News (2005-06), Sombras para estrellas y algunos eclipses (2007-08), Serie
Fortuna (2008), and Trayectoria de eclipses (2009), among others.
My meeting with Vargas Lugo shed light on several underlying elements of the piece that
I think are important in order to perform a more accurate rhetorical analysis of the artwork. In
most contemporary art pieces, an understanding of the artist’s decisions are crucial to untangle
the ideas that they are attempting to convey through their pieces. The artist/rhetor’s ideas and
explanations of his/her own work are therefore central to the rhetorical analysis.
Úrsula Dávila-Villa, on the other hand, was the curator in charge of the project Eclipses
for Austin. As mentioned before, this project emerged as part of the WorkSpace program created
by the Blanton Museum in the University of Texas in Austin. The role of the curator is also
crucial in contemporary artistic production. In this case, not only the selection of the artist was
Dávila-Villa’s decision but, primarily, the development of the project was a product of the
dialogue and exchange between the artist and the curator and, to this end, the Blanton Museum
was the facility that served as a space for experimentation, in Dávila-Villa’s words.
My interviews with the artist and curator broadened my perspective of this artwork. I find
it important to talk about the relationship between curators and artists as a specific form of
artistic production, which prevails in many contemporary art spaces. It is this idea of
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transdisciplinary collaboration that I also credit as central to Vargas Lugo’s piece for it included
the involvement of several people from different backgrounds and practices to its production.
In the following chapters, I will present my findings and analyses, which are the different
discourses that the artwork presents as responses to the rhetorical situation. I will describe the
operation of these discourses in rearticulating and expanding scientific knowledge.
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CHAPTER 4:
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Art completes knowledge with what is excluded from knowledge and thereby once again impairs
its character as knowledge, its univocity.
~Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory288
Solar eclipses are not astronomical events, they occur here in Earth.

~Pablo Vargas Lugo289

For this current chapter, I will identify and describe the way Eclipses for Austin is
operating in order to expand on the scientific knowledge of total solar eclipses. I will utilize
Bitzer’s idea of the rhetorical situation, as well as its concepts of exigence, constraints and the
fitting response, as my methodological framework to perform this analysis. First, I will identify
and describe the exigence or need to which the work serves as a rhetorical response. Then I will
identify and describe the different constraints that operate both in contemporary art, as well as in
scientific inquiry, by which the artwork comes into being. After, I will describe and discuss the
specific strategies of appropriation and rearticulation, which are used by Vargas Lugo in order to
respond to the situation and satisfy the exigence. Finally, I will describe the specific discourses
that emerge from the work of art and which I have identified as the fitting response in this
rhetorical situation; they comprise five discourses to which the work of art draws attention: 1)
total solar eclipses as collective events; 2) the focus on location and particularity of the
phenomenon; 3) the attention to the duration of each eclipse; 4) the emphasis on the memory of
the future; and, lastly, 5) the deprived mystic symbolism that, in general, prevails in our
contemporary experience of total solar eclipses.
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Exigence
It becomes difficult, as described in the previous chapters, to approach art from a
rhetorical perspective since rhetoric has been historically related to speech and public address,
whereas art has been, in general terms, related to personal interpretation and subjectivism.
Nonetheless, in previous chapters, I have laid out several examples of how art can be approached
from a rhetorical perspective. Contemporary art, as well as contemporary rhetorical criticism,
offers a broader range of perspectives for analysis (philosophy, psychoanalysis, formalism,
rhetoric, etc.), thus allowing us to frame art as a rhetorical artifact. Often, art is not conceived of
as rhetorical for its message and its address seem not entirely intelligible. Apparently, the spoken
and the written word provide a clearer message, thus a more solid ground to perform a rhetorical
analysis. In Larson’s critique of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation,290 he highlights the apparent
hermetic nature of Bitzer’s designation of rhetorical. As I have suggested earlier, Bitzer
perceives of both artistic and scientific discourses as operating in a different, almost nonrhetorical way291 since, for him, a rhetorical act would be that in which all the elements of the
rhetorical situation (exigence, audience, constraints and fitting response) are present. Larson
explains that this distinction produces, on the one hand, a set of two categories of rhetorical and
non-rhetorical; but he proposes a third category in which a rhetorical action is disabled by the
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failure to address and respond to the exigence.292 In my previous chapter, I explained that,
following Larson’s logic, a new fourth category could comprise those acts that are not expressly
enunciated as rhetoric but that, under a proper analysis, might be read as rhetorical for they meet
all the features of the rhetorical situation as proposed by Bitzer and address the exigence. I
understand Vargas Lugo’s Eclipses for Austin as a rhetorical event since it addresses a specific
exigence, is limited by several operative constraints, and more importantly, produces discourses
that respond to that exigence.
The first purpose of this analysis is, therefore, to identify the exigence to which the work
of art is responding. The exigence is often conceived of as a need, a necessity that requires the
rhetor to elaborate a response through his or her rhetorical work. The exigence could be
constituted by almost anything, from a persuasive goal to the importance of highlighting a social
issue, for instance. In this case, the exigence is generated by the polarization of scientific inquiry
and enunciation juxtaposed with contemporary art, as well as by a desire on behalf of the
artist/rhetor to integrate and create bridges between the two. As explained in Chapter 2, solar
eclipses are phenomena that are framed from very different, often dissimilar, perspectives. On
the one hand, its mechanisms are commonly understood scientifically but, at the same time, it
represents a precious event that is popularly celebrated and perceived of as cataclysmic, in
Vargas Lugo’s own words.293
This way, and far beyond the generalization of the differences between science and art,
there is a dissimilar account of solar eclipses as understood from astronomy and how they are
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lived bodily. Vargas Lugo was particularly interested in pointing out this difference, and this was
his motivation to produce such an installation.294 This exigence is generated mainly because of
the difference in both science and art (constraints), which I am going to address in the next
section. Hence, this exigence is given by the apparent biased (incomplete) account of total solar
eclipses as framed by science, thus requiring the focus on other aspects of the event that are often
circumvented when explaining the phenomenon.
Another need from which the artwork constitutes a response is also the personal inquiry
that the artist is carrying out through his project. In Chapter 2, I referred to contemporary
perspectives on the role of the artist. I highlighted the idea that the artist has gained new social
and political responsibilities,295 and the comparison that is often made between the latter and the
scientist as researchers/knowers.296 In this sense, Vargas Lugo’s work is also a culmination of a
personal inquiry to produce a new way to represent solar eclipses. As I have noted in the
introduction to this thesis, Eclipses for Austin is not the first artwork in which he explores this
specific topic. Previously, Vargas Lugo has explored, not only solar eclipses,297 but also time, the
cosmos, the future, and the aesthetics of the newspaper.298 For Eclipses for Austin, as Vargas
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Lugo states, he was looking for a project that would bring together most of his concerns;299 the
result is a complex artwork that contains several elements that address, independently, these
interests.
Constraints
Rhetorical constraints, as explained by Bitzer, are constituted by opportunities and
limitations that have the possibility to change the exigence.300 Operative constraints are those
constraints that do not depend on the rhetor and consist of beliefs, attitudes, traditions, and the
like, by which the situation, the audience and the rhetor are limited and framed.301 The
identification of these constraints is central to my analysis since they constitute the factors that
generate the exigence described previously and are also the specific limitations of scientific
knowledge that the artwork is addressing in order to generate a proper rhetorical response. After
describing these constraints I will discuss the appropriation and rearticulation of scientific
knowledge, which is the strategy from which Vargas Lugo is departing in order to create his
work.
Scientific Constraints
As explained in Chapter 2, there are several tenets and axioms that most scientific
practices share in common and that shape the way scientific knowledge is produced and
enunciated. Some of these principles constitute the constraints that derive in the exigence
described previously and that are addressed and contested by the work of Vargas Lugo. In this
299
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section I will point out some of these principles as they operate as constraints in this rhetorical
situation, and I will relate them to the specificity of the knowledge about solar eclipses as framed
by science.
• Mechanisms, mathematical understanding and measurement – The first constraint is
constructed by three interrelated tenets that drive the scientific inquiry in general. The
first one is the idea that natural events occur as a result of mechanisms, i.e., that
phenomena “are systems consisting of a collection of parts that interact with each other
in order to produce some behavior.”302 The proper understanding of nature’s
mechanisms is often conceived of as a mathematical understanding. Brisson and
Meyerstein explain that there is a generalized idea that the ultimate understanding of
nature and natural phenomena is mathematical, and that this idea has prevailed in
Western science since Plato’s Timaeus.303 This idea is related to the necessity of
measurement that also shapes scientific inquiry. Measurement, according to Chang and
Cartwright is the symbolic assignment of values to what is observed in an event.304
• Determinism and prediction – If natural phenomena are the result of mechanisms that
are available for us to know and understand, therefore, all natural events are determined
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by these mechanisms. Determinism in science, as Loewer explains,305 entails a logical
reasoning that prescribes the way an event is going to unfold based on the previous
requirements (mechanisms) that produces it. This idea is intrinsically related to the next
axiom/constraint, which is the possibility to predict natural events. If an event is
determined by mechanisms, and if these mechanisms are known and understood,
therefore, natural events can be predicted and postdicted (i.e., description of an event
occurred in the past).306
• Knowledge without meaning – As explained by Snellman, since Galileo in the
seventeenth century, the development of scientific thought has presupposed that
knowledge acquired through these means lacks of meaning.307 In other words, natural
events, astronomical phenomena, biological processes, and the like occur in nature
independently and carry out no further meaning for us or for nature. Rosenberg explains
that the ultimate step to support this idea was the development of the theory of
evolution during the nineteenth century, because it “demonstrated” that the natural
world operates outside ideas of transcendent purpose or of divine, immutable, design.308
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• Common ownership – This constraint is, in fact, the enabler of Vargas Lugo’s use of
scientific knowledge, thus being a possibility of the rhetorical situation. This idea, as
explained by Merton under the label of communism,309 indicates that “there is a
common ownership of goods in the scientific knowledge,”310 thus suggesting that
knowledge is not property of researchers but of humanity as a whole. This is also
related to the generalized “underlying belief in a material reality”311 that is also shared
by most scientific disciplines, as Mendelsohn explains. In this sense, scientific
knowledge is not understood as produced but rather discovered out of the physical
world. I will elaborate on this idea when I describe the strategies of appropriation and
rearticulation later in this same section.
Summarizing the constraints explained above, these describe in general the scientific
account of solar eclipses as events that 1) are the result of astronomical mechanisms, which are
understood by their mathematical dimension; 2) are determined by these mechanisms and,
therefore, can be predicted and postdicted with accuracy; 3) lack meaning beyond their
mechanical operation; and 4) their knowledge is universal and shared throughout humanity.
Solar eclipses, as previously stated, entail these constraints. Additionally, and in a more
specific sense, solar eclipses as framed by astronomy contain further constraints that delimit the
rhetorical situation. First, as explained in Chapter 2, it is the disciplines of astronomy and
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astrophysics that are in charge of providing an explanation of what the phenomenon is. Also,
astronomy complies with the tenets explained previously in regard to conceiving of solar eclipses
as events without meaning. There is, nonetheless, acknowledgment of the power of solar eclipses
and recognition of its significance in different cultures and times but, as I laid out in Chapter 2,
these acknowledgments usually frame that significance as otherness.312 Furthermore, when
astronomy refers to other (often ancient) cultures and their relationship to eclipses, it is to praise
their mapping methods and to relate them as antecedents to contemporary scientific methods.313
Finally, after mapping methods are set and commonly accepted by the scientific
community,314 astronomers and astrophysicists, in general, lose their interest in solar eclipses as
objects of study, but become interested in using them as research tools to test other
phenomena;315 this idea is summarized by astrophysicist Jay M. Pasachoff when he refers to
solar eclipses as the "astrophysical laboratory.”316 These constraints not only offer a scientific
account of how the phenomenon is understood, but also expose its importance and significance
to the scientific community as an astronomical event.
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Contemporary Art and Artistic Constraints
Let us remember that Bitzer’s concept of constraints within the rhetorical situation is
constituted by limitations as well as possibilities that shape the exigence. In this sense, the
majority of the artistic constraints to be described are, in fact, enablers for the rhetorical
response; after all, my thesis is concerned with how contemporary artistic practices can serve as
a space to expand on scientific knowledge. Nonetheless, I have also identified limiting
constraints that make this epistemological enterprise not as easy as it is claimed and, therefore, I
am going to describe these as important constraints operating in this rhetorical situation.
Art, as I previewed, is often referred to as a space of freedom and experimentation in
which different issues and questions might be posed and addressed. For instance, utilizing
McLuhan’s concept of media environments,317 which work as envelopes that wrap us and,
therefore, are intrinsically imperceptible, Elena Lamberti states that art can serve as a counterenvironment, an outsider, in order to make those environments visible.
In other words, art (literature, visual arts, new installations and performances) become the
counter-environment suggested to speculate, in real time, on the effects that, in time, new
technologies have on the environment and on our societal matrixes; it offers to
individuals a way to retrieve an active role in the making of individual and collective
identity, something that is to be defined (or redefined) also through the act of
remembering.318
This statement is strongly related to McLuhan’s conception of art as autonomous and
operating under its own assumptions.319 As Lamberti points out, McLuhan considered art (for
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instance when talking about painter Wyndham Lewis) to be a place from which to look back to
our environments and reflect on them: “McLuhan always considered Lewis's productions as
counter-environments determined to detect and express cultural, societal and technological
change.”320
Julian Stallabrass, on the other hand, when discussing the idea of art as a zone of freedom
states that
The freedom of art is more than an ideal. If, despite the small chance of success, the
profession of artist is so popular, it is because it offers the prospect of a labour that is
apparently free of narrow specialization, allowing the artists, like heroes in the movies, to
endow work and life with their own meanings.321
Stallabrass later expands on the forces and rules of the market, art galleries, and
exhibition spaces to develop his ideas322 but, besides the economical and political constraints of
art, in regard to its production, it could offer a more or less space of freedom in which to address
social, political, or even scientific issues with innovative perspectives.
Other artistic constraints that affect the situation in regard to the intersection of art and
science is the lack of a common ground of what transdisciplinary collaboration between the two
should produce.323 This apparent discrepancy is, nonetheless, often overestimated. The lack of
common goals does not necessarily lead to rejection to collaborate. Curator Dávila-Villa
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explained that when Vargas Lugo approached other departments at UT, it was easier for him to
be listened to for “researchers see artists more as equals than curators;”324 thus confirming the
postures outlined in Chapter 2, in which the role of the artist is analogous to that of the scientist
or researcher. In Eclipses for Austin, however, due to the nature of the topic or the ambitions of
the artist, transdisciplinary collaboration with science was neither essential nor necessary. In the
next section, I will elaborate on how these specific constraints led the artist to use appropriation
and rearticulation as his artistic strategies to bridge the two disciplines.
Finally, given that Eclipses for Austin is a visual work, the expectation of scientific
visualization also constitutes a constraint. As discussed in Chapter 2, visualization is often
understood as the visual rendering of scientific discoveries and results under the claim that it
facilitates understanding.325 However, when visualization is subsumed to a scientific enterprise,
it automatically assumes its principles and axioms (some of the constraints described in the
previous section), i.e., the idea of veracity, lack of meaning, accuracy, measurement, etc. The
limitations of such expectation are contested by Vargas Lugo’s choice of how the image is
constructed and what it represents, which I will address in detail in subsequent sections of this
analysis.
Appropriation and Rearticulation
When trying to identify how the artwork is contributing to knowledge, I noticed that, to
start, the artist is not discovering knowledge about solar eclipses through alternative
methodologies to those of science; that is, the artist did not engage in empirical research to trace

324

Úrsula Dávila-Villa, interview by C. Rodrigo Guzmán, July 2012, transcript.

325

See, for instance, Lemke, “Multiplying Meaning;” Dean, “Dimensions of Data,
Turned Into Art That Speaks;” and McCandless, “The Beauty of Data Visualization.”
98

solar eclipses or to discover what the phenomenon is. Rather, he is purposely using and
rearticulating what is already known about these phenomena as enunciated by science through
the use of charts that map future eclipses. However, it is in the use and re-enunciation of these
very same data that the artwork proposes any new knowledge about the event.
Originally, I considered describing this gesture as part of the fitting response of the
artwork as rhetorical artifact, but later I realized that rather than a discourse emerging from the
artwork, the appropriation and rearticulation of scientific knowledge is the strategy the artist is
using to approach the issue. Appropriation has been a common practice in contemporary art
since the late 1960s. In general, appropriation in art has been related to the use or copy of images
that are not produced by the artist and is often considered to be a reflective gesture that draws
attention to the very nature of authorship, ownership, and creation.326 Nevertheless, appropriation
often refers to images and, more specifically, artistic images. Elaine Sturtevant is recognized as a
pioneer of artistic appropriation who, during the 1960s, imitated with stunning correspondence
the works of artists like Roy Lichtenstein, Claes Oldenburg, Jasper Johns, Frank Stella, and
Andy Warhol.327
As Sherri Irvin points out, appropriation became a common topic in art once it was
performed in appropriating art itself, 328 like in Sturtevant’s appropriations or in works by artists
like Sherrie Levine, Richard Prince, Cindy Sherman, Barbara Kruger, and Yasumasa Morimura;
however, this practice was already common in art by artists like Warhol who inserted popular
326

Texts like Michael Foucault’s “What is an Author?” and Roland Barthes’s “The Death
of the Author” are often cited as indispensable references to understand appropriation in art.
327

Sherri Irvin, “Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art,” The British
Journal of Aesthetics 45, no. 2 (2005), 124.
328

Ibid.
99

imagery into the fine arts world or, significantly earlier than him, Marcel Duchamp who, in the
early twentieth century, utilized mass produced daily-life objects. In this sense, appropriation in
art should be understood, beyond the idea of the copy, as intertextuality, in other words, as a
citation that borrows elements, information, approaches, etc., from other practices or people.
Thus, appropriation should not be reduced only to images but also to methods, data, perspectives,
and the like. Artist Hans Haacke is an excellent example of an artistic practice that resembles a
methodology used, in this case, in social sciences and political polls.329 Another remarkable
example is Mary Kelly’s work Post-Partum Document, developed between 1973 and 1979, in
which Kelly documented six years of her mother-child relationship with her son.330 The
installation of the artwork featured notes, diagrams, objects, photographs and other documents
that recreated an almost archaeological documentation of the process. The piece served also as
an empirical contestation to Lacan’s psychoanalytical theories about the child’s fantasies and
fixations with the mother, thus also contributing to knowledge.331
In the case of Eclipses for Austin, although the artist arguably is utilizing a conventional
visual representation of the eclipsed sun,332 the main form of appropriation is the use of
knowledge generated from science. Maps of solar eclipses are usually published in large catalogs
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that feature charts of the past and future eclipses that will be seen from several places in earth.333
It is this information what Vargas Lugo is utilizing as his departure point to focus on four future
solar eclipses that will be experienced from the Austin/Texas area.
Conversely to the use of images, which often leads to copyright issues and legal
confrontations, appropriating science appears to be harmless. If this is the case, it is so because
of the very constraints of scientific inquiry. As explained in previous chapters, science is
enunciated as the ultimate form of knowledge production that, in order to operate properly,
should be communicated and publicly owned.334 It is in this sense that the artist’s inclusion of
this knowledge is rather a gesture of intertextuality than of appropriation, thus being aligned, to
some extent, to the scientific discourse of collective ownership and usage. Vargas Lugo’s use of
this information made me reflect on who the owner of scientific knowledge is? Is it he or she
who produces it or the person who uses it to create something else?
Vargas Lugo’s use of scientific information (data) could be perceived of as mere
inclusion of knowledge in the same way other artists utilize knowledge about materials,
concepts, theories, and the like to produce their works. However, I propose that it is correct to
see his gesture as a gesture of appropriation since he not only uses the information but also
presents it in a way similar to how it is usually presented in scientific charts. The first two pages
of the brochure Sun, which accompanies the installation, present three charts listing a) all the
future eclipses to be seen from the Austin, Texas area up to 3000 CE; b) the next ten total
333
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eclipses whose umbral path will cross over Texan territory; and c) the four eclipses performed at
the UT Stadium for the installation (Figures 16a and 16b). These three charts resemble those
from science, in which solar eclipses are listed; in future sections I will go in detail on how these
charts also differ and offer an alternative experience to data presentation.
For this piece, Vargas Lugo’s intention was originally to work in collaboration with the
Astronomy department at the University of Texas.335 Curator Dávila-Villa also stressed the
importance of the WorkSpace program’s aim to foster collaboration between different
departments within the university.336 However, when Vargas Lugo approached the UT’s
department of Astronomy, few people were interested in collaborating in the project, probably,
as Vargas Lugo himself points out, due to the idea of solar eclipses as events of mere popular
interest (rather than of scientific interest), and the lack of necessity to further scientific inquiry on
the nature of this phenomenon.337 In Chapter 2, I elaborated on the complications and issues that
often arise when the scientific and the artistic disciplines aim to collaborate. One of these
complications is the lack of common ground, or similar expectations, that the participants have at
the moment of the collaboration; this issue has been already highlighted by several studies.338
The artist, later, as he explained to me, discovered that the collaboration with astronomers
and astrophysicists was not necessary, and that most of the information he used regarding solar
eclipse mapping is available online and in other sources.339 This derived, I think, from the
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appropriation of this knowledge in order to create something else, instead of attempting to
propose an alternative methodology to achieve the former, or to create transdisciplinary
collaboration between the artist and scientists.
In this sense, Vargas Lugo’s ultimate aim was the rearticulation of scientific knowledge.
As he explained to me, his intention was neither to contest nor to discredit knowledge as
enunciated from science,340 but to use it and reframe it in a different way; thus, his piece intends
to utilize a result of scientific inquiry and provide it with a different visual representation.
According to Vargas Lugo, when artists are engaged in projects that include science or
technology, they often do so in order to give the work a sense of accuracy, of truth, providing it
with some sort of validation.341 Conversely, he opted to utilize an almost incoherent342 form of
representation that challenges science, the card-stunt performance.343 This operative decision is
crucial, and I will return to it when I discuss the responses that the work of art proposes in terms
of collectiveness and the memory of the future; for now, however, I just wanted to point out only
what Vargas Lugo is retaking from science and what exactly is he proposing to scientific
enunciation and representation.
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Finally, and as a prelude to the discursive responses that I will describe in subsequent
sections, when I asked the artist the reason why he wanted to focus on this topic (total solar
eclipses), and through this specific way of operating (appropriating scientific knowledge), he
responded that he was interested in what is irrelevant to science, what is excluded, i.e., the
sawdust of the scientific,344 to use his own words. I find this response correspondent with
Adorno’s idea that art contributes to knowledge by drawing attention to what is excluded from
it.345 In this sense, I think that the discursive responses that I am about to describe express the
intention of the artist to draw attention to those features that exist during solar eclipses, but
which do not constitute the centrality of the scientific account of such phenomenon.
In the next section of the analysis I will proceed to identify and describe the five
discourses that emerge from the work of art: 1) collectiveness; 2) location and particularity; 3)
temporality and duration; 4) memory of the future; and 5) symbolism as they constitute what
Bitzer calls a fitting response in the rhetorical situation.
Response I: Collectiveness
One of the first features to stand out from Eclipses for Austin is that the image of the
eclipses is formed through a card-stunt performance, in which participants flip two-colored cards
to recreate the sun being occulted by the moon’s path. Vargas Lugo’s idea was to create an
image made by the collectivity that the event supposes.346 For the artist, these events gather
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people around, thus becoming collective spectacles. In this sense they are related to sports and
other social events.347
This feature of the work represents the main rhetorical response that the artwork contains
because it is the only one of the five that in fact proposes to focus on an aspect of solar eclipses
that is often disregarded from most scientific accounts of the event, the idea that solar eclipses
are lived collectively and socially. As I will explain later, the rest of the responses work to draw
attention to aspects that are regularly contained in science but that have less importance than the
mechanical description of the event.
Collectiveness in Vargas Lugo’s work resembles the way eclipses are being experienced
in the social world, and it is presented not only in the way the four eclipses are depicted and
enacted but also by the act of placing the representation in a sport stadium, thus making the
connection with other collective events. At the same time, Vargas Lugo proposes a new way to
represent the scientific.348
The idea of the collective is also present in the choice of news-like brochures that convey
part of the idea of the artwork to the public, as well as the presentation of the performances in
four television screens displayed in the gallery, which show the massiveness of solar eclipse
experience. As Vargas Lugo explained to me, not only is the event lived and experienced
socially, but it is also highly mediated.349 Before and after the event has occurred, the media
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provide full coverage of it, and these images are always present in the experience of the
phenomenon.
As a result of this overwhelming mediation, the artist explains, thousands of similar
images appear everywhere.350 As a response to this cliché, Vargas Lugo decided to create an
image that was incoherent to what it represents.351 As previously explained, scientific
visualization often is subsumed to the norms and tenets of science; regarding solar eclipses in
specific, these images are either “historical” accounts of previous eclipses captured by cameras
or computerized animations of the event as abstract, i.e., without any reference to an specific
eclipse. I will elaborate on this idea when I talk about the fourth response, the memory of the
future, and discuss Vargas Lugo’s intentions to document an event that has not happened.
When Vargas Lugo arrived in Austin, Dávila-Villa explains, he already had the idea to
work, somehow, with card-stunt performances (Figures 1 and 2).352 Vargas Lugo was first
interested in the idea when, while living in Peru, he watched the videos of the prisoners of the
Shining Path Communist Party of Peru,353 in which its adherents recreate images of the hammerand-sickle symbol while chanting revolutionary slogans.354 Vargas Lugo wanted to, first, use a
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technique that entails communal unity in order to be created, and secondly, to provide this often
perceived as mundane, pre-cinematographic performance with another use (scientific or
artistic).355 In this sense, Vargas Lugo’s choice of the card-stunt performance not only creates an
image sine manufacta, which paradoxically complies with scientific standards of detachment and
no interpretation, but it is in itself an embodiment of collectivity.
When Vargas Lugo explained to me his inspiration on the Shining Path, I commented
that, indeed, these types of performances often remind me of either communist or totalitarian
regimes.356 He agreed that this technique is often used propagandistically, and this is why he
wanted to use it for something else, to show something beyond the political.357 In fact, he
commented that he was invited to write about the political implications of this piece through this
type of performance, which he thinks are, if existent, quite subtle.358 In this sense, the artwork is
completely different from Estadio Azteca by British artist Melanie Smith, a piece that
represented Mexico in the 2011 Venice Biennial, which uses the same performance technique. In
her piece, Smith, in collaboration with curator José Luis Barrios, addresses the political
instability of Latin American countries and offers a critique of the state of chaos and ruin that,
arguably, prevails economically and politically in this area.359
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Finally, beyond representing the collective aspect of solar eclipses, the work pretends to
resemble the power of convocation that such phenomena entail. Part of Vargas Lugo’s idea was
to recreate those four eclipses not only by their visualization but also by their function. Although
the artwork is not the performance, since the eclipses were recorded and later presented in the
gallery, the representations required a large number of volunteers, hence an open call was
released. Vargas Lugo’s purpose with this is clear; at the end of the artistic statement for the
piece, the artist states that “Eclipses for Austin aims to become a platform where a grand
experience can be shared by many creating a sense of community and exaltation.”360
Through this feature especially, then, Vargas Lugo draws attention to how the event is
constructed, not as an astronomical event but as a social/collective event that needs to be
experienced and charged with social meaning in order to exist. As he states, this artwork delves
into the idea that “solar eclipses are not astronomical events, they occur here in Earth.”361
Response II: Location and Particularity
Future and past solar eclipses, as explained previously, are often described by science in
long systematic charts. These publications, like NASA’s “Five Millennium Canon of Solar
Eclipses,” regularly feature coordinates and graphics that show specific paths of eclipses and the
places from where they will be/were observed.362 Certainly, the information regarding location
and particularity is not missing in the scientific account of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, this
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enunciation neither highlights those specificities nor picks out particular eclipses over others.
This is related to the axiomatic scientific belief in the universality of knowledge.
As opposed to the scientific framing of the event, Eclipses for Austin is concerned with
locality, because it represents eclipses that will be visible from a very specific geographical area.
Particularity, on the other hand, is present in the selection of the four eclipses that are simulated.
The work presents reenactments of four future eclipses—April 8, 2024; April 14, 2200; July 17,
2205; and February 25, 2343.
I find that this gesture of locality complies with contemporary critiques of science, for
instance, Haraway’s idea of the situated knowledge. For her, the premise of scientific objectivity
is nothing but an idealistic fallacy: “objectivity turns out to be about particular and specific
embodiment and definitely not about the false vision promising transcendence of all limits and
responsibility.”363 As a result, she proposes instead a “feminist objectivity is about limited
location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object
proposition.”364
Although Haraway speaks of location in a more abstract way, i.e., regarding
acknowledgment of the position of the researcher and his or her biases, I think Vargas Lugo’s
piece is a material example of situated knowledge. For Haraway, objectivity is irresponsible
knowledge365 when it claims totality because it does not depart from any body. Haraway
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advocates for a knowledge that focuses again on the located body.366 In this sense, Vargas
Lugo’s work is an example of situated knowledge, not only because it focuses on a geographical
location but also because, as we shall see, it departs from the body, from the personal, individual,
located experience with solar eclipses.
Location is evident from the very name of the project, but it is also present through many
other elements that are included in the brochure in the gallery. The first image in the Sun
brochure, after the cover, is a map of Texas on the third page (Figure 17), showing the four paths
of the eclipses being reenacted. It is notorious how each umbral path differs from one another
both in location as well as in width. The umbra for the eclipses on 2024 and 2343, for instance,
cross Austin, although they differ in width, whereas the umbra for the eclipse in 2200 crosses the
state almost horizontally far away from Austin.
The videos presented in the gallery concordantly differ from one another in duration and
perspective of the camera (Figures 3 and 4). I will discuss time and duration in the next section.
The camera position in each one of the four videos makes the experience with each one different.
While the first eclipse, April 8, 2024, presents the eclipse almost from a central shot, the next
one, April 14, 2200, presents it from a ground level, “worm’s-eye,” angle shot. The eclipse in
2205 is shot from an entrance to the stadium and, finally, the 2343 eclipse is shot directly from
the opposite side of the stadium, also from a ground level angle.
In pages five and six of the brochure (Figure 18), a schematic representation of the four
eclipses is presented, showing the difference in the way the moon will cover the sun as observed
from Austin, Texas. The brochure also features photographs of each reenactment; however, each
performance, in the brochure, presents different amount and arrangement of pictures. The first,
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the next Austin eclipse in 2024, features a single double-page spread in the middle of the
newspaper. The 2200 eclipse is presented in ten pictures arranged in three rows (Figure 19). The
2205 eclipse is presented in 32 pictures arranged in four eight-column rows (Figure 20). Finally,
the last eclipse, the one in 2343 is presented in 40 pictures arranged in eight five-column rows
(Figure 21).
What is the purpose of these differences? I think the work appeals to the different ways
that we experience these events, the different places, moments, memories that come to mind
when remembering them. The work is highly personal, and although audience analysis is not part
of this thesis, some personal accounts and testimonies, which are included in the brochure, might
be analyzed as part of the artifact.367 The curatorial text, written by Dávila-Villa, appearing in
pages seven to eight, describes a reflection on her own relationship with solar eclipses that
Vargas Lugo’s work has triggered. The text starts as follows:
While living in Mexico City, I witnessed one of the longest solar eclipses of the last
decade on July 11, 1991. Never before have I experienced nighttime darkness descend in
the middle of the day as the sun became totally eclipsed by the moon and its delicate
ethereal corona became visible while the horizon turned into a splendid spectacle of
sunset colors.368
The focus on location and particularity might appear to be obvious in the work; however,
as Vargas Lugo expresses, what the project aims for is to propose a way of representing,369 thus
providing a mobile work that might be reproduced anywhere and whose results would vary
accordingly. In fact, the work has been proposed to be recreated in other cities like Buenos Aires,
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Mexico City, Porto Alegre, and others.370 In this sense, it is a work that pertains to a specific
group of people, a specific community.371
The focus on location and particularity, according to the artist, also contests, in a located
way, the knowledge that solar eclipses are cyclical and, furthermore, abundant. Scientific
knowledge of the phenomenon’s mechanisms, as well the astronomical mapping of it, shows
that, given the geometrical aspect of the event, solar eclipses are actually cyclical,372 and not as
rare as we think.373 However, Vargas Lugo’s work draws attention to the personal, located
experience of eclipses, as once-in-a-lifetime events that are, primarily, experienced bodily and
personally.
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Response III: Temporality and Duration
In the same way that location and particularity are provided in scientific charts of solar
eclipses, specific durations often accompany these data; thus, this information is not particularly
absent either. However, just as in the previous section, temporality and duration are secondary in
the scientific enunciation of solar eclipses or, when present, lost in a sea of numbers and
coordinates. Elements like the use of video and music and adding a soundtrack to the
phenomenon expose the artist’s concern with the actual temporality of the event; that is, the real
measurable time that the eclipse takes to occur.
Due to the geometry of the event and the position of the celestial bodies, each solar
eclipse differs significantly from others. The distance between the Earth and the moon is
approximately 238,900 miles; between the Earth and the sun is 92,960,000 miles; and, as
explained by Seeds and Backman, the sun is 400 times larger than the moon but nearly 400 times
farther away.374 Given these proportions, the moon’s umbra during a solar eclipse is never bigger
than 168 miles (270 km), and it sweeps the Earth’s surface at 1000 mph (1600 km/hr); thus the
sun cannot be totally eclipsed for more than seven and a half minutes.375 According to NASA,
the shortest total solar eclipse lasted for one minute and 50 seconds, in 1882, and the shortest
annular eclipse lasted for only 21 seconds, in 1810.376 Therefore, the duration of a solar eclipse
ranges from just a few seconds to seven minutes and 30 seconds.
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The first significant element in Vargas Lugo’s artwork is the use of video (Figures 3 and
4). When discussing the similarities and differences between photography and video, Christian
Metz states that video, through movement and plurality, implies time377 and, citing Peter Wollen,
explains that this imposes a “reading time.”378 Therefore, as opposed to a photograph, the viewer
is required to experience Eclipses for Austin within a temporal framework.
The next significant element is the addition of music to each eclipse. Vargas Lugo
expressed to me his interest in musicalizing, or almost choreographing, each eclipse to provide
the event with specific temporality. For the music, he worked with percussionist Eric Peterson to
create a musical composition to accompany the representations. The composition consists of a
percussion beat (about 40 bpm), utilizing more than 12 instruments,379 that mark the card
flipping. According to Metz, sound in video also affects time, because “one of the properties of
sounds is their expansion, their development in time (in space they only irradiate), whereas
images construct themselves in space.”380 In this sense, both movement and sound, through the
use of the video, foster a timely experience with the event, as opposed to a mere spatial or
representational encounter with the image. The use of sound also served to assure unity while the
participants flipped the cards during the performance.
In the gallery, each eclipse had its own duration and was screened at separate times; this
way, the audience in the gallery would experience eclipses differently, not only given the
different angles and perspectives in which they are being shot, but also by their different
377
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durations and screening times. This feature, in a way similar to the previous one of location and
particularity, draws attention to the specific duration of each eclipse and, thus, differentiates each
from the other.
Response IV: Memory of the Future
One of the axiomatic tenets of science, which has already been described and discussed,
is the idea of predictability. Solar eclipses are immersed in a dichotomy that is given by, on the
one hand, the stunning bodily experience of the event and, on the other hand, its accurate
predictability through the use of mathematical formulae. Eclipse mapping is, relatively, an easy
enterprise;381 prediction of solar eclipses and other astrophysical phenomena is the result of
meticulous and highly accurate tracing methods.
Eclipses for Austin exposes this dichotomic interplay of accuracy and prediction with the
social impact, both collective and individual, that these phenomena entail. This projected
memory is present in many elements of the artwork, from the chart of eclipses that will take place
between the years 2010 and 3000 presented in Sun to the testifying act of recording the
reenactment of the eclipses to the action of witnessing the event that has not yet happened but
whose date and time is well-known in advance.
Vargas Lugo has shared with me that his intention was to create both an artwork whose
content refers to something beyond the present, as well as an artwork with an “expiration
date.”382 This adds to the interplay recently discussed: on the one hand, the participants of the
performances are reenacting eclipses that will take place in the future, some of which, with
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accurate certainty, they will not be able to experience in their lives; on the other hand, although
the furthest eclipse represented will take place in 2343, after this date, the artwork will be
obsolete and reduced to nothing more than a representation of past events.
The theme is reiterated by the Sun brochure developed, according to Vargas Lugo, to
create the sensation that it is documenting an event of the past (Figures 5 and 15).383 The display
of Sun in the gallery took the shape of a newsstand aesthetic that has been previously explored
by Vargas Lugo in works like Bonampak News. The newsstand, the “information urban
sculpture” as Vargas Lugo calls it,384 relates both to the massiveness of the events and to the idea
of the past event and, then again, to the ambiguity of the use of time in the work (the future event
made present, and then transformed into past, etc.).
The choice to recreate future events and then document them challenges the mere
scientific idea of the document. In general terms, as explained previously, the scientific image of
a solar eclipse is either a documentation of a historical event, or a schematic representation of the
phenomenon in abstract. In semiotics, according to Peirce’s theory of signs, the signs that relate
to their referents in a physical way and testify to their existence, because they are physically
affected by the referent, are referred to as indexes.385 Photographs of previous eclipses would be
indexes. In contrast, abstract representations that relate to their referents through a process of
convention are called symbols.386 The schematic scientific representations of eclipses as abstract
events would be symbolic in nature.
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The representations created by Vargas Lugo, however, can neither be indexical, for their
referents have not happened yet, nor symbolic, since they refer to specific events and do not
operate upon an agreed convention. They refer to those four eclipses, at most, in an iconic way,
resembling certain visual features that we know in advance they will possess when occurring.387
Hence, if their referents have not yet existed, isn’t that the very definition of the simulacrum, a
sign that precedes its referent?388 Vargas Lugo simulates solar eclipses and makes them present,
the “future simultaneous.”389 All this ambiguity and oscillation in reference to time, memory,
and the future is primarily given by the operation of documented reference to the future and the
display of the project through televisions and newspapers.
The use of the news-like brochure (Figures 4 and 5) also relates to our hyper-mediated
experience with solar eclipses and its contrast with the scientific account of it, which also
produces another dichotomy: on the one hand, the scientific charts provide accurate information
on any foreseeable eclipse but, on the other hand, it seems like we relate more to solar eclipses
when these are referred to in the media. The scientific information of all the eclipses that we
might experience in life is already there but yet, we do not know it on a regular basis. It is almost
as if we were satisfied with just knowing that it is there, awaiting to be activated in a closer time
by its mediation; after all, if a solar eclipse is to happen in the near future, it is not likely that we
are going to miss it by any means.
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It is true that the scientific charts with the list of solar eclipses already predicted calls our
attention to the future and the predictability of the event. However, I conceive of this rhetorical
response as more self-reflective on what this predictability means. Am I going to still be living
by then? Will I be here for the next solar eclipse? Or, as Vargas Lugo states in the interview
presented in the Sun brochure, “will Texas exist as Texas?”390
The idea of prediction is strongly related to the decline of any symbolism in solar
eclipses, not only because the event is no longer contingent or cataclysmic,391 but because their
contemporary prediction complies with the scientific belief about the material world as
independent from any human observation and meaning. As Vargas Lugo explains in the artistic
statement for the project: “As with other natural phenomena, the depth of our understanding of
these events goes in direct proportion to their loss of mythical sheen.”392
Response V: Symbolism
Eclipses, as I have discussed in previous chapters, are ambiguous events that transit
between astrophysical explanations, mysticism, religion, and superstition. However, at first sight,
it seems that in both the scientific enunciation of solar eclipses, as well as in Vargas Lugo’s
piece, there is an obliteration of the symbolic/mystic dimension of the event. Although in the
gallery label, the official project description, and the artist’s statement there is an
acknowledgment of mystical interpretations of eclipses, the installation appears to circumvent
this mysticism. For instance, the gallery label reads: “An eclipse on May 28, 585 CE ended a war
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between the Lydians and the Medes, who stopped fighting when day was turned to night and
subsequently agreed to a peace treaty.”393 The official project description reads in a similar tone:
“In ancient times, and in some cultures today, solar eclipses have been attributed to supernatural
causes.”394 Nonetheless, the presentation of the performances on the screens and in the Sun
brochure offers little or no acknowledgement of these ancient mysticisms.
In science, this circumvention of meaning is given because it is not part of the scientific
concern; it is a purposeful omission that complies with the axiomatic idea that knowledge exists
without meaning. At first, I thought this feature was a shared aspect between science and Vargas
Lugo’s work, but the artist’s statement, as well as my personal interviews with him, made me
realize that he is indeed drawing attention to meaning. In his statement, Vargas Lugo suggests:
I’d argue that eclipses keep the power of unsettling our most cherished expectations.
Eclipses have thus turned into the greatest natural spectacle available to humankind.
More than any other astronomical event, they generate expectation and buzz; people
travel to see them and collect memorabilia, making the experience of an eclipse one of
the highlights of their lives.395
Thus, once again, Vargas Lugo highlights the personal, bodily experience of solar
eclipses, drawing attention to the individual experience, memory, astonishment, the idea of the
cosmic spectacle, and its collective convocations. This is the specific meaning to which Eclipses
for Austin is directing our attention. Furthermore, mystical/religious meaning in the actual
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installation is addressed reticently, as the author notes in the interview in the final pages of Sun:
“Will it look like sun worshipping?”396
Vargas Lugo’s work focuses on the meaning described above due to the fact that, in
general, solar eclipses are experienced differently in contemporary societies (not all of them)
based on the way our knowledge of the event is constructed by science. In other words, given
that our understanding of solar eclipses is shaped primarily by science, our relationship to the
event now takes a different form, away from magic, but still close to astonishment and joy;
away, probably, from religion, but still akin to sport events and spectacles. This is how the
artwork operates, in Vargas Lugo’s words, as a “collective ritual, a reverse commemoration of
events.”397
Solar eclipses, as suggested by the work, do not lack meaning, but the latter is shaped,
and changes accordingly, in relation to our understanding of the phenomenon. The meaning that
the work draws attention to is a sense of bodily experience, of reflection, of memory and future,
of collective experience and individual amazement; however, this meaning, as I said, varies and
is mobile. In this regard, and summarizing this idea, the artistic statement, as well as the project
description feature the following Mark Twain’s quote: “An occultation of Venus is not half so
difficult as an eclipse of the sun, but because it comes seldom the world thinks it's a grand
thing.”398
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Chapter Summary
In this chapter, I have applied the rhetorical methodology of Bitzer’s rhetorical situation
to identify and describe the elements of exigence, constraints, and the fitting response that are
present in the specific rhetorical situation addressed by Eclipses for Austin by Vargas Lugo. The
exigence, or need, is given by the incomplete account that science, astronomy, and astrophysics
in particular, provide in regard to solar eclipses, as well as the apparent dichotomic polarization
between this account and our personal bodily experience with the phenomenon. The work of art
comes into being as a response to this exigence, as well as a culmination of the artist’s personal
inquiry into and interests in solar eclipses, scientific representation, memory, time, future, and
mediatization.
The exigence entails several constraints that limit and shape the situation. I have
identified two different types of constraints as coming from the nature of scientific inquiry, or the
art world. The scientific constraints are primarily constituted by the axiomatic tenets that most
sciences share and that limit their inquiries and conceptions of the world. These constraints
comprise the following scientific ideas about solar eclipses: 1) that eclipses are the result of
astronomical mechanisms, which are understood by their mathematical dimension; 2) that
eclipses are determined by these mechanisms and, therefore, can be predicted and postdicted
with accuracy; 3) that eclipses lack meaning beyond their mechanical operation; and 4) that
knowledge of solar eclipses is universal and shared throughout humanity. Additionally, for
astronomy and astrophysics, after eclipse-mapping methods are set and commonly accepted,
solar eclipses are conceived of as tools to perform further scientific tests on gravity variation,
chemical components, relativity, and the like, constituting also a final scientific constraint. In this
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rhetorical situation, the work of art either responds to or seizes these constraints as they operate
as limitations as well as possibilities that enable the fitting response.
With regard to the fitting response in this situation, I have identified five discourses that
emerge from the work of art that directly address the exigence and, ultimately, expand on
scientific knowledge of solar eclipses. These responses are summarized as follows:
• Collectiveness. The work emphasizes the collective experience of solar eclipses by
creating the images through cart-stunt performances (a collective technique), addressing
the massive mediatization of the event and resembling the power of convocation that
the event often entails.
• Location and Particularity. Solar eclipses are often listed in endless charts that appeal
to universalities and generalities. The work of art, conversely, focuses on four specific
future eclipses and a specific geographical area, from which the eclipses will be
observed. The work also stresses particularity by presenting different perspectives on
the images of the eclipses, both in stills and in video, as well as the differences of their
umbral paths as they will cross the territory of Texas.
• Temporality and Duration. The work vindicates the specific temporality of each eclipse
by stressing its duration. This is achieved through the use of audiovisual elements
provided by the video and the soundtrack composed specifically for the artwork. This
response, similarly to the previous one, also draws attention to particularity and
difference.
• Memory of the Future. The work presents the interplay of dichotomies in which the
event is immersed. Solar eclipses are both stunning and buzzing events, as well as
predictable, foreseeable natural phenomena. The knowledge of any past and future
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eclipse is detailed in scientific charts of the event but, at the same time, we experience it
more vividly when it is mediated and becomes an expected event experienced by the
collective. In this regard, too, the artist proposes a work that serves both as a prediction,
a simulacrum, as well as a dated work of art that will change its meaning eventually as
the four eclipses occur.
• Symbolism. This final response focuses on the contemporary individual and collective
meaning that we invest onto solar eclipses. Science prescribes the lack of meaning in
natural events and processes, whereas Vargas Lugo draws attention to the construction
of social and personal meaning of solar eclipses through bodily experiences, the
memories, the reflections, etc., thus, highlighting the nature of a highly meaningful
event.
Through these responses, the work of art draws attention to aspects of solar eclipses that
are either disregarded or perceived as secondary in the scientific account of the phenomenon,
thus providing an expanded, more located and specific understanding of the issue as a social
event. The work of art operates as a rhetorical artifact that generates certain discourses and, by
doing so, enables an expansion of our knowledge and understanding of, in this case, solar
eclipses. The work, as stated by curator Dávila-Villa, makes you think extra-artistically, asking
us to go beyond the aesthetic to delve into other realms.399
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CHAPTER 5:
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
For this final chapter, I will consider the analysis I have performed in the previous
chapter to revisit my research questions as stated in Chapter 3 and attempt to answer them
directly. I will also reflect upon the use of rhetorical criticism to analyze contemporary art.
Finally, I will draw my final conclusions on this analysis as well as consider the broader
implications of my findings and make suggestions for future research.
Research Questions Revisited
In Chapter 3, I posed my research questions as well as described my methodology for
analyzing Vargas Lugo’s work. A culmination of my thesis requires a reflection upon these
questions, which propelled my study: What are contemporary artistic practices generating when
they rearticulate scientific means of knowledge production and enunciation? What rhetorical
discourses emerge from these practices as a response to expand upon scientific knowledge? I
will address these two questions individually in the following subsections.
Rearticulation of Scientific Knowledge
Although artists are even more involved in collaborative projects and research settings,
artistic-oriented research and science are still dissimilar, thus generating uneven conditions for a
smooth collaboration with equal expectations from both sides. In fact, this very thesis, because of
its topic, which falls between the cracks created where several disciplines collide, has been
subject to different expectations and dissidences between the people who helped me bring it to
fruition.
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Eclipses for Austin exemplifies these situations, since the original idea of the artist was to
collaborate more closely with the astronomy department at the University of Texas.400 Given this
situation, one of the main strategies used by contemporary artists to create bridges between art
and science is the appropriation and rearticulation of the knowledge provided by the latter.401
Appropriation, as explained in Chapter 4, is an artistic maneuver that was popularized in
the 1970s and the 1980s, often related to image copying and imitation.402 However, in works like
Vargas Lugo’s, what is being appropriated is knowledge. This gesture, however, might go
unnoticed given the scientific belief on a collective ownership of knowledge,403 an idea that
prescribes that scientific knowledge is discovered, not produced, thus public as opposed to
private.404
To answer my question about what do contemporary artistic practices generate when they
rearticulate scientific knowledge, through appropriation, I performed my analysis on the

400

Pablo Vargas Lugo, interview by C. Rodrigo Guzmán, August 2012, interview A,

transcript.
401

The exchanges between experts from different disciplines and their
communication/translation of expertise to the general public is addressed in articles like Harry
M. Collins and Robert Evans, “The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and
Experience,” Social Studies of Science 32, no. 2 (2002): 235-296.
402

Sherri Irvin, “Appropriation and Authorship in Contemporary Art,” The British
Journal of Aesthetics 45, no. 2 (2005), 124.
403

Georg Franck, “Scientific Communication--A Vanity Fair,” Science 286, no. 5437
(1999), 53.
404

A recent example of a similar scientific appropriation in an artistic project is the
installation Étude taxonomique-comparative entre les Castes de la Nouvelle Espagne et celles du
Mexique Contemporain [Taxonomical and Comparative Study Between the Castes of New Spain
and those of Contemporary Mexico], from 2010, by Mexican artist Erick Meyenberg, in which
he used knowledge from the Mexican genome project to trace the percentages of African,
Spanish and Indigenous blood in the constitution of the contemporary Mexican population.
125

discourses from which they emerge. Nevertheless, before detailing the specifics on how these
discourses expand our knowledge and understanding of certain topics, it might be useful to
conclude that these artistic practices generate discourses that juxtapose and integrate both
systems of production and meaning making. When contemporary artist retake science to use in
their artworks, they ask us to think about issues in novel ways and to reflect on the validity and
authority of scientific knowledge alone. They make us think, not only on what we know, but how
we know it; they reflect on knowledge itself.
Also, the artworks that arise from this premise tend to transcend, in a way, the constraints
of both science and art in order to construct a new realm of cognition and experience, a realm in
which we are provoked and asked to reflect, remember, make connections and, furthermore,
expand our understanding of the world. In making this provocation, almost like incitement, these
artworks require us to compare and collate different worlds, i.e., different accounts of reality—
the world of science, of art, of sports, of family, of memory, of the future, of media, etc.
Discourses as Rhetorical Response
If art is understood as a rhetorical response to a situation, several discourses can be read
and analyzed from Eclipses for Austin. These discourses constitute the fitting response in
Bitzer’s rhetorical situation. In general, contemporary artistic practices that expand our
knowledge or understanding on a specific subject and that depart from the scientific account of
it, do so through two closely related actions. First, they draw attention to aspects absent in the
scientific perspective and, secondly, they emphasize those aspects that are usually regarded as
secondary or that do not stand out in science. The first action generates discourses on elements
previously absent in science; these elements should be analyzed in each specific case, since
different artworks address different things. In the case of Vargas Lugo’s work, this discourse
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constitutes the focus on the collective, spectacular, experience with solar eclipses. The second
action, on the other hand, produces discourses that vindicate what is framed as secondary in
science, such as the focus on location and particularity, the timely and bodily experience of a
natural event, the reflection on the very tenets of science, like predictability and determinism,
and the meaning/symbolism that is often discharged from natural phenomena.
These discourses vary, as I said, amongst different artworks but, in general, they depart
from a more located, subjective encounter with the natural world. In the case of the artwork
analyzed here, I identified, for example, that the artist complies with Haraway’s concept of
situated knowledge.405 Not only is he focusing on geographical and time particularities and
acknowledging his agency in the process of communicating the phenomenon, he also departs
from the body,406 from the individual, located experience of solar eclipses beyond its scientific
understanding and appeals to self-reflection, memory, meaning, and amazement. As curator
Dávila-Villa explains, the artwork makes you think about all these aspects of solar eclipses
(specific duration, mediatization, the social experience, etc.) but, beyond that, it makes you think
where you were during the solar eclipses you have experienced and how you lived them, as well
as where and how you will experience the forthcoming ones.407
The question whether art can contribute to knowledge, or not, which was a broader point
of departure for this thesis, is then addressed through the scrutiny of the rhetoric of knowledge
enunciation. In these lines, contemporary art seems to address and disarticulate organized
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knowledge, namely science, by drawing attention to what it excludes, to what it cannot include in
its account to describe the world, and by highlighting, at the same time, those principles that
constrain science to complete its mission of unifying knowledge.
Rhetorical Criticism in Contemporary Art
Classical rhetorical criticism is often related to language; however, contemporary
rhetorical criticism offers a broad range of tools from which to approach a diversity of rhetorical
artifacts. In this sense, contemporary visual rhetoric is central to my methodology and analysis of
contemporary art. The study of visual artifacts,and of fine arts in particular, might be useful in
order to focus in on a more individual experience with the art object, thus privileging a focus on
the affect and the aesthetic experience over specialized knowledge in, for instance, art history or
sociology of art. Sonja Foss explains that,
Visual rhetoricians are interested in the impact of visual symbols on lay viewers—
viewers who do not have technical knowledge in areas such as design, art history,
aesthetics, or art education. Lay viewers’ responses to visual artifacts are assumed to be
constructed on the basis of viewers’ own experiences and knowledge, developed from
living and looking in the world.408
Furthermore, as explained by Foss and Radich,409 the art object becomes a portal in
which the audience enters to discover the artist’s perspective of the world. In this sense, and
following Helmers in saying that “all artistic production is the result of decisions made by the
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artist and is created for particular audiences.”410 The artist, then, can be identified as the rhetor in
a given situation since, through his or her practice, decisions, and actions, the exigence is
addressed, whether expressly or not; at the same time, the rhetor is limited by several operative
constraints and formulates a fitting response as a result.
Finally, rhetorical approaches to visual arts might also shed some light on underlying
discourse of artistic and visual conventions. In my analysis, I have identified in Vargas Lugo’s
piece a purposeful decision by the artist to use a collective, pre-cinematographic, systematic way
of representing eclipses, thus addressing, through an incoherent411 way to represent the scientific,
the solid conventions of the visual conveyance of knowledge. As Kostelnick and Hasset explain,
“conventions prompt invention: they rarely standstill. They respond to technology, cultural
values and knowledge,”412 and in so, are rhetorical.
These approaches to art are useful because they offer a broader understanding of the
actors and discourses involved in a rhetorical act without the necessity of relating the art object,
the artist, or the artistic action to a specific artistic movement, style, form, medium, or even
artistic predecessors, which, although present at the moment of the production of the piece,
might become secondary in the regular individual experience of the work of art by the audience.
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Limitations and Future Implications
Finally, to give closure to my thesis, I would like to take a moment to reflect on its
limitations and to suggest the ways in which this study could contribute to future thought and
research.
My study, as I explained in Chapter 2, did not focus on audience reception, although
some personal accounts and testimonies were taken into account as part of the artifact. If art is to
contribute to knowledge, a study of how people gain knowledge when experiencing art might be
done. This suggested study, however, could take many forms and might not be framed from
rhetorical criticism (for instance, if it is approached more ethnographically). Understanding the
audience’s personal reactions to these artifacts as sources of cognition would be, ideally, a
confirmation of what is being proposed in this thesis. However, the reason why I decided not to
include the component of an audience analysis, beyond the time constraints and the workload,
also relies on the idea that knowledge production does not necessarily mean knowledge
consumption. An artist, as well as a researcher, can produce knowledge, and render information
to foster understanding on specific subjects but this does not requires somebody to learn it in
order to exist. In this sense, I agree with Bitzer who himself recognizes that both science and art
do not necessitate of an audience in the same sense as a public address does;413 however, I think
that both perspectives, as explained in Chapter 3, do need a rhetorical enunciation (the
communication of knowledge in science, the exhibition in art), in order to come into being.
Another limitation of this study, which could represent more of a bias than a limitation,
might also lie in my personal relationship with both the artist and the curator. Indeed, my
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interviews with both have shed light in the issue and had helped me confirm some of my
findings; it is also true that they might have shaped the way I experience the artwork myself, thus
aligning perhaps with the discourse that the artist wanted to get across with his work instead of a
mere analysis of its elements.414
Finally, I would like to conclude by pointing out the possible implications of this study
for future research. This thesis proposes a way to understand the interaction and relationship
between two systems of knowledge production and meaning making that are dissimilar. I think
that, with this study, through the emphasis on particularities (both of astronomy and astrophysics
on behalf of science, and of contemporary art), outlines a way in which these two accounts of the
world interact in order to create a broader, more comprehensive perspective of a specific natural
phenomenon, and by doing so, exemplifies the way contemporary art and science, in general,
interact with each other.
I think, additionally, that one of the main outcomes of this thesis is the application of
rhetorical methodology to contemporary art, which is still scarce. Although contemporary
rhetoricians stress the importance of analyzing art from a rhetorical perspective, most research
along these lines still focuses on figurative artworks.415 I think this study is an example of the
application of these methodologies to art that, although offering visual representations of nature,
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constructs its discourses on attitudes, decisions, and spatial, temporal and sound elements that
generates a complex artifact within a very specific rhetorical situation. After all, as Thierry de
Duve states,
Of course, in order to be progressive – and how could art of any significance not be
progressive? – attitude had to be critical. Lukács, Adorno, Althusser and others were
called in to tell would-be artists that neither talent nor creativity were needed to make art
but, instead, that “critical attitude” was mandatory. And the fact that not just artists but all
“cultural workers” were thought to be in need of a critical attitude of course helped to
shape a new, strongly politicized discourse about art and its relation to society.416
In this sense, the contemporary artistic practices that reformulate and re-enunciate science
not only depart from a critical attitude towards the production of knowledge and meaning but,
also, they invite us to share of this attitude and question ourselves about the things we know, and
the way we know and approach the world.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES

Figure 1. Eclipses for Austin (still from video), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 2. Eclipses for Austin (still from video), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.

143

Figure 3. Eclipses for Austin (installation), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 4. Eclipses for Austin (installation), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.

Figure 5. Eclipses for Austin (installation), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figures 6 and 7. Sombras para estrellas y algunos eclipses, 2007-08. Courtesy of the artist.

Figure 8. Bonampak News, 2005-06. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figures 9 and 10. Serie Fortuna, 2008. Courtesy of the artist.

Figure 11. Serie Fortuna (detail), 2008. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 12. Intemperie, 2012. Courtesy of the artist.

(left to right) Figure 13. Reloj I, II and III, 2003; and
Figure 14. Trayectoria de eclipses, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 15. Sun (brochure), Cover, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 16a. Sun (brochure), p. 1, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 16b. Sun (brochure), p. 2, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 17. Sun (brochure), p. 3 (page detail), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.

Figure 18. Sun (brochure), p. 5 and 6, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 19. Sun (brochure), p. 11 and 12, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.

Figure 20. Sun (brochure), p. 15 and 16, 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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Figure 21. Sun (brochure), p. 17 and 18 (page detail), 2009. Courtesy of the artist.
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